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ABSTRACT 
 
 Despite the voluminous historical literature concerning American missionary 
efforts in the Middle East during the 19th and early 20th centuries, the international work 
of the Young Men’s Christian Association has figured only marginally into most of these 
accounts. Similarly, the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922 and the “Great Fire” of İzmir, 
which concluded that conflict and brought an end to Hellenism in Asia Minor, remain 
largely disregarded episodes in the English-language historiography of the immediate 
post-World War I era. This thesis will address the place of İzmir between the Greek 
“Great Idea” and Kemalist “Anatolianism,” the YMCA’s efforts to establish itself in this 
contested city during the Greco-Turkish conflict, the vital role of the YMCA secretary 
Asa K. Jennings in evacuating Greek and Armenian refugees during the fire, and 
conclude with Jennings’ subsequent drive to continue YMCA work in Turkey under the 
nascent Kemalist Republic of Turkey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................... iii 
I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................  1 
II. THE YMCA AND THE İZMIR FIRE: THE HISTORICAL RECORD .................  5 
 Foreign Service and the YMCA .......................................................................  5 
 The İzmir Disaster ............................................................................................. 10 
III. THE GREAT IDEA, TURKISM, AND THE GRECO-TURKISH WAR ............. 19 
 The Megali Idea ................................................................................................ 19 
 Evolution of Turkish Nationalism .................................................................... 24 
 Onset of the Greco-Turkish War....................................................................... 29 
IV. THE YMCA IN ANATOLIA ................................................................................. 37 
 Beginnings ........................................................................................................ 37 
 The İzmir Association ....................................................................................... 48 
 The Destruction of İzmir ................................................................................... 54 
V. THE ANATOLIAN PROJECT ............................................................................... 62 
 The Early Kemalist Era ..................................................................................... 62 
 Jennings’ Desire to Continue ............................................................................ 65 
 Anatolian Project and the Turkish Hearth ........................................................ 71 
 The Smyrna Welfare Council ........................................................................... 74 
VI. CONCLUSION....................................................................................................... 78 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 84
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although in the United States the Young Men’s Christian Organization is no 
longer identified primarily as an institution devoted to the spread of the Gospel, its 
origins were explicitly religious, dedicated to both societal reform and proselytizing. The 
fact that YMCAs operate today in over one hundred and fifty countries is a testament to 
the fundamentally missionary character of this organization. The 1844 “Paris Basis,” the 
founding document of the World Alliance of YMCAs, stated succinctly:  
 The Young Men’s Christian Associations seek to unite these young men who,  
regarding Jesus Christ as their God and Saviour according to the Holy Scriptures, 
desire to be His disciples in their faith and in their life, and to associate their 
efforts for the extension of His Kingdom amongst young men.1 
 
That the YMCA today, especially as an international institution, is much more dedicated  
                                                            
 
1 C. Howard Hopkins, History of the YMCA in North America (New York: Association Press, 1951), 78.  
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to issues of social justice like poverty, human rights, and AIDS relief, shows how 
ambiguous the phrase “the extension of His Kingdom” is, and how its interpretation has 
changed over the past century and a half, which is largely the result of German “Higher 
Criticism,” theological liberalism, and the rise of the Social Gospel.  
 The appearance of a progressive theology was not the only catalyst for this 
evolution in Christian missions in general, and the YMCA in particular. Inherent in the 
millennialism endemic to most varieties of Protestantism was an urgency to spread the 
Gospel not found in Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and “high-church” 
amillennial Protestant denominations. Pre-millennialists stressed the need to save as 
many souls as quickly as possible before the return of Christ and His establishment of a 
thousand-year kingdom on earth;  post-millennialists posed that Christ would only return 
after believers had “conquered” the world through evangelization and established Christ’s 
reign for him. In both cases, the urgency to spread the Gospel was pressing, and many of 
the early nineteenth-century missionaries fully anticipated the world’s non-Christians to 
be receptive to Christianity. 
 The world proved to be less amenable to the tenets of Protestant Christianity than 
many missionaries had hoped. While each foreign mission had its own unique challenges, 
the lands of Islam proved especially recalcitrant to their efforts. Apostasy was forbidden 
to Muslims by Qur’anic law upon pain of death; Oriental Jews, the initial target of the 
missionaries, were mostly unresponsive to Christianity; and eastern Christians faced 
ostracism within their communities and excommunication from their churches for even 
entertaining Protestant ideas. 
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 The paltry conversionary results of the missionaries’ first several decades in the 
Islamic world precipitated the question of whether to continue the focus on 
evangelization, or to modify their efforts and pursue humanitarian and educational work 
among the unconverted. The YMCA was very much a participant in this question. By the 
turn of the century, its leaders such as John Mott and Sherwood Eddy had placed it on a 
course away from an evangelistic emphasis and toward a “civilizing” one, stressing 
education and instilling morals over the spread of the Gospel and conversion. 
 Institutions like the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions 
(hereafter, ABCFM) had operated within the Ottoman Empire since the early nineteenth 
century. The YMCA, however, was a latecomer to the Sultan’s domains, with its first 
branch opening in İstanbul on the eve of the First World War. Similar to other American 
missionary groups though, the YMCA targeted Ottoman Armenians, Christian Arabs, and 
Ottoman Greeks. Shortly after the conclusion of World War One, the YMCA established 
a small branch at İzmir (or Smyrna), whose population at the time was so 
overwhelmingly Christian and Greek that the city was derogatorily termed giaour İzmir 
or “İzmir of the infidels” by the Turks of the empire.2 
İzmir’s Christian population had made the city something of a beachhead for 
Western missionary penetration of the Ottoman Empire, with the International College, a 
girls’ school, and the YWCA all antedating the establishment of the YMCA in 1919. 
Despite lacking the deep roots of other missionary institutions in the city, the case of 
İzmir’s YMCA is intriguing for several reasons. First, Asa K. Jennings, a YMCA 
employee in İzmir in 1922, was instrumental in engineering the rescue of a great number 
                                                            
 
2 Florence A. Fensham, Mary I. Lyman and H.B. Humphrey, A Modern Crusade in the Turkish Empire 
(Chicago: Woman’s Board Mission of the Interior, 1908), 43. 
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of the city’s Christian population when the town was put to fire at the end of the Greco-
Turkish War of 1919-1922, a largely forgotten act of heroism in a pivotal but often 
overlooked conflict. Second, with Jennings’ help and largely because of the goodwill 
engendered by his assistance in ridding İzmir of its Christians, the YMCA was one of the 
few foreign institutions allowed to continue operating in Turkey after the establishment 
of a secular and nationalist republic in 1923. Finally, this effort to continue missionary 
work in Turkey, though of a decidedly de-Christianized nature, accentuated the tension 
between the evangelistic and humanitarian wings of the missionary movement.  
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II. THE YMCA AND THE İZMIR FIRE: THE HISTORICAL RECORD  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foreign Service and the YMCA 
It is unsurprising that Jennings’ name and the work of the YMCA in Turkey are 
not widely known, as there is a conspicuous dearth of book-length works in English 
concerning its history. Despite a voluminous literature by the ABCFM’s missionaries, 
and substantial work written about the missionary impact upon individual minority 
groups of the empire, notably the Arabs and Armenians, to date no historian has produced 
a monograph on the missionary impact in Turkey during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.3  
The most significant text, and essentially the only one, to examine the foreign 
work of the YMCA in a comprehensive manner is Kenneth Scott Latourette’s mid-
                                                            
 
3 Hans-Lukas Kieser, “Mission as a Factor of Change in Turkey (Nineteenth to First Half of Twentieth 
Century),” Islam and Christian Muslim Relations Vol. 13, No. 4 (2002): 391.  
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century study, World Service: A History of the Foreign Work and World Service of the 
Young Men’s Christian Association of the United States and Canada (1957). Latourette 
was both a scholar of Christian missions in the Far East and the history of global 
Christianity. He also served for a time on the International Committee of the YMCA, 
making him doubly qualified to write such a history. The scope of the book is wide-
ranging and the detail contained in Latourette’s country by country case studies is 
exhaustive. His book is dated though, and only chronicles the YMCA’s foreign efforts 
with a minimum of critical analysis, undoubtedly a reflection of the time period in which 
it was written. 
 Similar to Latourette’s World Service is Clarence Prouty Shedd’s History of the 
World Alliance of Young Men’s Christian Associations (1955). This text, despite having 
an international scope, is not concerned with the content of the YMCA’s work in foreign 
countries. Rather, it traces the development of the institution of the World Alliance itself, 
an international body of North American and European YMCAs. Shedd’s focus was 
institutional, and he was more preoccupied with the affairs of YMCA executives at 
World Alliance conferences than with the effect those gatherings had upon individual 
YMCAs throughout the world. 
 Finally, though Charles Howard Hopkins’ History of the Y.M.C.A. in North 
America does not have an international scope, and refrains from examining YMCAs 
outside of the United States and Canada, his work remains indispensable as a general 
reference book concerning the development of the YMCA. The book has particular value 
in tracing the YMCA’s relation to the evolution of American Christianity over the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the apex of the missionary movement in the 
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United States. Because the YMCA movement was so definitively a missionary one 
though, Hopkins could not refrain from addressing it as such. In several instances, he 
explains the push to expand overseas, without going into detail on the specifics of foreign 
ventures.4  
 These works comprise the most comprehensive accounts of the YMCA’s 
evolution, and thus are indispensable to any historical research concerning it. 
Nonetheless, they display a common set of characteristics that serve to limit their 
usefulness today. First, and most obvious, is the fact that all of these writings date from 
the 1950s. Not only does the past fifty years of the YMCA’s work not figure into these 
accounts, but the style of scholarship in these books is antiquated. History of the Y.M.C.A. 
in North America, World Service, and History of the World Alliance are all meticulously-
researched, factual accounts of the YMCA, yet all lack a thematic or analytical 
framework within which to interpret the organization’s growth. Also, the authors’ 
accounts of the YMCA display highly sympathetic portraits. As all three were either 
associated with the YMCA or had elsewhere written admiringly of it, and the three books 
were published under the YMCA’s auspices, the objectivity of their work is questionable 
at best.5 
 East Asia proved to be the earliest and most resiliently fruitful area of study for 
the YMCA’s foreign work after the accounts of the 1950s. Sinologist John K Fairbank’s 
1969 call to write the missionary, the “invisible man of American history,” into accounts 
                                                            
 
4  Hopkins, History of the Y.M.C.A. in North America, 309-360. 
 
5 As stated above, Latourette had himself served on the International Committee of the YMCA. C. Howard 
Hopkins would later go on to write a highly sympathetic biography of John Mott, and Clarence Prouty 
Shedd, a scholar or religion and education, was also an advocate of the YMCA. See Clarence Prouty  
Shedd, “Open Doors for Religion in the State University.” The Journal of Higher Education Vol. 30, No. 4 
(Apr., 1959): 227.  
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of China has begun to be met by historians interested in the YMCA. Given the 
voluminous material in the organization’s archives concerning China and the Far East 
though, much work is to be done before we have anything close to a full picture of its 
work there.6  
Shirley Garret’s Social Reformers in Urban China: The Chinese YMCA, 1895-
1926 (1970) and Jun Xing’s Baptized in the Fire of Revolution: The American Social 
Gospel and the YMCA in China, 1919-1937 (1996) represent the most significant works 
on the YMCA’s foreign mission to China in the early twentieth century, with Jon Thares 
Davidann’s A World of Crisis and Progress: The American YMCA in Japan, 1890-1930 
(1998) accomplishing the same for Japan. Common to all three books is a marked move 
away from the evangelistic and institutional focus that characterized Hopkins’ and 
Latourette’s work, and an effort toward depicting the YMCA’s foreign work in the 
contexts in which it was operating. Also common to all three books is an emphasis on the 
primacy of the Social Gospel in the YMCA’s mission, with its theological dexterity and 
potential to be synthesized with the Confucian order of both Japan and China.7 These 
works are also notable in pointing out, contra the landmark works of the 1950s, that the 
shift to a social service-oriented mission was as much the result of the ineffectiveness of 
traditional proselytism in non-Western settings as it was a function of the shifting 
theological currents in the United States.8 
                                                            
 
6 John K. Fairbank, “Assignment for the 1970s,” The American Historical Review Vol. 74, No. 3 (Feb., 
1969): 877. 
 
7 Jon Thares Davidann, A World of Crisis and Progress: The American YMCA in Japan: 1890-1930 
(Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1998), 23-24. 
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East Asia was viewed by many missionary societies as the most fertile region for 
planting the seed of the Gospel, and by 1920 over half of the missionaries operating there 
were American. It is therefore unsurprising that the quantity of historical scholarship 
concerning the Association’s work in East Asia outnumbers that concerning the rest of 
the non-Western world.9 It is perhaps because the YMCA arrived relatively late in the 
Middle East and managed to maintain only a small presence in the Islamic world over the 
twentieth century that there remains a paucity of scholarship concerning its efforts there. 
Indeed, the only work dedicated to the organization’s endeavors there is a 2006 
dissertation concerning the architecture of the YMCA’s Jerusalem facility in the context 
of multiculturalism, a topic only tangentially related to the YMCA’s actual work in 
Palestine. Similar is Kenneth Steuer’s Pursuit of an Unparalleled Opportunity: The 
American YMCA and Prisoner of War Diplomacy Among the Central Power Nations 
During World War I, 1914-1923 (2009). The YMCA had for all intents and purposes shut 
down in the Ottoman Empire at the end of 1915, and by the following year D.J. Van 
Bommel was its only secretary working in the empire. Steuer’s story of the YMCA’s 
“war work” in the Islamic world then is primarily one of the negotiations between the 
Association and the Ottoman government to establish a War Prisoners’ Aid program.10 
Apart from relief efforts to British and Indian troops during the Mesopotamia and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
8 William R. Hutchison, “Missionaries on the ‘Middle Ground’ in China,” Reviews in American History 
Vol. 25, No. 4 (Dec., 1997): 633; Jon Thares Davidann, “The American YMCA in Meiji Japan: God’s 
Work Gone Awry,” Journal of World History Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring, 1995): 110.  
 
9 Albert Feuerwerk, “The Foreign Presence in China” in The Cambridge History of China Vol. 12: 
Republican China, 1912-1949 Part I, eds. Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), 169. 
 
10 Kenneth Steuer, Pursuit of an Unparalleled Opportunity: The American YMCA and Prisoner of-War 
DiplomacyAmong the Central Power Nations During World War One (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2009), http://www.gutenberg-e.org/steuer/steuer.ch15.html (accessed February 5, 2010). 
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Palestine campaigns, the YMCA lay mostly dormant during the Great War in the Islamic 
World. Yet the account of the YMCA in The Pursuit of an Unparalleled Opportunity 
remains as one of a precious few published works depicting the YMCA’s work in the 
Middle East at all. 
THE İZMIR DISASTER 
 The YMCA’s missionary labors in the Middle East have been overshadowed by 
its work in China or subsumed under the work of the American Board, which was the 
dominant missionary force in the Middle East for over a century. However, the 
association did participate in a pivotal yet overlooked episode in Turkish history, namely, 
the İzmir fire in September of 1922, which incinerated most of the city and precipitated 
the exodus of its Greek and Armenian populations. And while the YMCA’s invisibility in 
the historiography of American missions in the Middle East is largely the result of simple 
omission, the episode of the İzmir fire has been anything but innocently passed over. The 
city’s destruction often has been either deliberately purged from the historical record, or 
bent to serve a Turkish nationalist discourse unconcerned with the human catastrophe 
embodied in the event.11 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s enduring “cult-of-personality” status as the central 
figure of the Republic of Turkey’s history has created a situation in which to question 
him, or the state-sponsored Turkishness he tried to forge, can effectively end a public 
intellectual’s career in Turkey.12 Therefore, historical issues involving minorities that 
                                                            
 
11 Onur Yıldırım, “The 1923 Population Exchange, Refugees and National Historiographies in Greece and 
Turkey,” East European Quarterly Vol. 40, No. 1 (March, 2006): 46. 
 
12 Howard Eissenstaat, “History and Historiography: Politics and Memory in the Turkish Republic,” 
Contemporary European History Vol. 12, No. 1 (Feb., 2003): 94. Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, 
enacted in 2005, made it a crime to “insult Turkishness.”   
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reflect poorly upon Turkey’s leaders or government, particularly the ongoing Kurdish 
issue and the Ottoman Armenians’ fate during the First World War, have often been 
ignored or overlooked in deference to the Turkish state’s official line.13  
Mustafa Kemal himself perhaps set the precedent for Turkish silence on the İzmir 
affair in his famous six-day speech in 1927. He stated that “our armies, which were 
already on the quais at Smyrna, had reached the first aim which I had indicated to them 
when I pointed them to the Mediterranean,” and that he was “proud and ever happy to be 
the son of a nation and the commander of an army that can perform such a deed.”14 He 
made no mention of İzmir’s destruction, and the city’s capture was simply the concluding 
act to the bitter war with the Greeks. Turkish historians in the republican era have, on the 
whole, followed a strict Kemalist line, glorifying the Turkish nation and the secular 
republic Mustafa Kemal created, and not questioning the Turkish Republic’s, and indeed 
the Ottoman Empire’s, often dubious record concerning minorities. 
The major English-language historians of the Ottoman Empire and modern 
Turkey, then, have on the whole toed the Kemalist line concerning the tragedies 
perpetrated against the minorities during both eras. The 1990s neo-Ottomanist revival in 
the political sphere has undoubtedly resulted in historians of Turkey moving away from 
the notion of everything Ottoman being negative with everything republican being 
positive, but few historians of Turkey have tackled the Armenian question or the impact 
                                                            
 
13 Fatma Müge Göçek, “Reading Genocide: Turkish Historiography on the Armenian Deportations and 
Massacres,” in Middle East Historiographies, eds. Israel Gershoni, Amy Singer, and Y. Hakan Erdem 
(Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2006), 109.  
 
14 Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha, A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustafa Kemal, October, 1927. (Leipzig: 
K.F. Koehler, 1929), 567-568.  
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of the population exchanges of the Treaty of Lausanne.15 The same largely holds true for 
the İzmir affair. For example, Bernard Lewis’ The Emergence of Modern Turkey (1961) 
echoes Mustafa Kemal’s 1927 speech in both its brevity and interpretation, stating 
tersely, “The Turks won a crushing victory at Dumlupınar and, driving the Greeks before 
them, reoccupied İzmir on 9 September, thus completing the reconquest of Anatolia.”16 
Unlike Lewis, Stanford and Ezel Kural Shaw’s History of the Ottoman Empire and 
Modern Turkey, Vol. II acknowledges the burning of the city, but almost immediately 
turns polemic, asserting that the real “atrocity” was the allegation that the “victorious 
Turkish army was responsible for burning the conquered second city of the old empire.”17 
Even Erik J. Zürcher’s Turkey: A Modern History (1993), a work praised for its openness 
in discussing Ottoman minority issues, mentions the event only in the context of the 
overall physical destruction of the Greco-Turkish conflict.18 And though the 
aforementioned works represent only a tiny fraction of the English-language histories of 
modern Turkey, Lewis, Shaw, and Zürcher’s books are of the most influential on the 
subject, and indicate an intentional historical amnesia concerning what happened at İzmir 
in 1922.  
                                                            
 
15 Yılmaz Çolak, “Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: Collective Memory and Cultural Pluralism in 1990s 
Turkey,” Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 42, No. 4 (July, 2006): 590. Turkish historian Taner Akçam stands as 
a notable exception. See A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish 
Responsibility. New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC., 2006.  
 
16 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey. 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 254. 
 
17 Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II: 
Reform, Revolution, and Republic-The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977), 363.  
 
18 Donald Quataert, “Review of Turkey: A Modern History by Erik J. Zürcher,” British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies Vol. 22, No. 1/2 (1995): 190; Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London and New 
York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1998), 172. 
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Despite the American Consul George Horton’s damning account of the 
destruction of the city in Blight of Asia and Ernest Hemingway’s 1930 short story “On 
the Quai at Smyrna,” novelist Henry Miller nonetheless proclaimed in his 1941 
travelogue of Greece, The Colossus of Maroussi, that “the Smyrna affair, which far 
outweighs the horrors of the First World War or even the present one has been somehow 
soft-pedaled and almost expunged from the memory of present day man.”19 Though 
Miller was writing only twenty years after the fire, the disaster at İzmir, much like the 
Armenian massacres of 1915, had largely disappeared from the public consciousness. It 
would be another thirty years before the city’s destruction would finally be registered in 
the historical record in a manner befitting the magnitude of the event. 
Marjorie Housepian Dobkin’s Smyrna, 1922: The Destruction of a City (1971) 
was the first work of history to examine the İzmir affair with any depth rather than curtly 
describing it as the coda to the Greco-Turkish conflict. In spite its age, the book remains 
the most significant exposition on how the events of September, 1922, came to pass, and 
offers an excellent introduction to the conflict between the Greeks and Turks in Asia 
Minor between 1919 and 1922. Smyrna, 1922 was exhaustively researched, drawing from 
the national archives in both the United States and London, the personal papers of the 
significant figures of the event such as US Consul George Horton and US High 
Commissioner Admiral Mark Bristol, and interviews with several persons who witnessed 
the fire. Dobkin’s portrait is a comprehensive one, and it remains the standard work on 
the topic.  
                                                            
 
19 Henry Miller, The Colossus of Maroussi (New York: New Directions Books, 1975), 172. 
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Its thoroughness and landmark status notwithstanding, Housepian Dobkin’s 
account is hardly a disinterested one concerning the relationship between the Turks and 
Christian minorities of both the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic. In her 
introduction to Smyrna, 1922, Dobkin professes to “finding as many Turkish and pro-
Turkish sources as possible, especially as these touch on the two most sensitive 
areas―the treatment of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915-1916 and events in İzmir and 
environs in 1922.” Only a few pages later though, she goes on to thank some of the most 
influential and vocally pro-Armenian historians of the past half century, such as Richard 
Hovannisian and Vahakn Dadrian, for their guidance in composing the book.20 Similarly, 
Housepian Dobkin’s treatment of the rise of the Ottoman Turks could scarcely be 
described as disinterested, especially when she contrasts them with the Armenian and 
Greek peoples whom they ruled. The state of the minority rayahs (“sheep”) or giaours 
(“infidel dogs”), in Housepian Dobkin’s words, “was totally dependent on the pleasure of 
their conquerors, and it was tolerable only so long as there was a modicum of 
statesmanship and control within the Ottoman administration.”21 This is a gross 
oversimplification of the Islamic millet system, in which Christians and Jews were 
second-class citizens of a sort but were on the whole afforded a great deal of tolerance. 
Put in the context of her other writings, it is obvious that she had something of an agenda 
                                                            
 
20 Marjorie Housepian Dobkin, Smyrna, 1922 (1971; reprint, New York: Newmark Press, 1998), 7, 17-18.   
 
21 Housepian Dobkin, Smyrna, 1922, 25-26. Both of Housepian Dobkin’s translations are somewhat 
misleading. Giaour, derived from the Arabic word kafir or “unbeliever,” in Ottoman Turkish was indeed a 
religious slur concerning non-Muslims, but simply meant “infidel,” at least according to the 1856 J.M. 
Redhouse English-Ottoman dictionary. The word “dog” is Housepian Dobkin’s addition. Similarly, the  
word rayah, also derived from as Arabic word, does indeed signify “sheep,” but in a political sense a more 
accurate definition would be “citizen.” For more on the definition of rayah see Eli Kedourie’s essay, “The 
Chatham House Version” in his The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies. (Chicago: 
Ivan R. Dee, 2004): 351-394, especially pp. 362-364.  
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concerning the Ottoman minorities’ fate between 1915 and 1923.22 Similar to the debate 
of whether or not the Ottoman government’s actions with the Armenians constituted a 
premeditated state policy of extermination, the debate around İzmir has often devolved 
into accusations over who started the fire. Most Turks blame the Armenians, if they 
mention the topic at all, while Greeks and Armenians place guilt upon the Turks. 
Her polemics against the Ottomans and partiality to the Greeks and Armenians 
notwithstanding, Housepian Dobkin’s account is unquestionably the standard work on the 
subject. It is also notable for introducing the figure of Asa K. Jennings to the world, 
offering the first account of his work in evacuating İzmir’s refugees from the quay to 
nearby Mytilene. Nonetheless, Housepian Dobkin offers little background on the 
YMCA’s presence in the town, and Jennings departs from her narrative as quickly as he 
appears to rescue the Christian population.  
The same holds true for Giles Milton’s Paradise Lost: Smyrna, 1922. The 
Destruction of a Christian City in the Islamic World (2006). Milton lauds Jennings 
perhaps even more than Housepian Dobkin, but there is a similar lack of context in 
Paradise Lost concerning Jennings’ presence there in the first place. There is also no 
mention of his friendly relations with the Turks after the war. And whereas Housepian 
Dobkin uses the İzmir fire largely as a vehicle for airing her grievances concerning the 
Armenians’ treatment at the Ottomans’ hands, Milton also uses the context of İzmir to 
tell a story of another of the Empire’s “minorities,” though one even less numerous than 
the Armenians of the city. 
                                                            
 
22 Marjorie Housepian, “The Unremembered Genocide,” Commentary Sep. 1966, 55-61.  
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The narrative of Paradise Lost centers around the “Levantines,” a class of 
commercially-minded Europeans who had exploited the advantageous economic 
circumstances of the capitulatory system erected in the Ottoman Empire during the 
nineteenth century. Though retaining European citizenship, the Levantines often had 
resided in the empire for several generations, and therefore felt İzmir to be their home.23 
Milton’s focus on this class is an interesting one, as the Levantines of İzmir, who mostly 
resided in the city’s northeastern Bournabat district, constituted a tiny and 
disproportionately affluent segment of the population. And although the Levantines 
undoubtedly shared in the suffering associated with the destruction of the city, their 
experience was decidedly different from that of İzmir’s Greeks and Armenians trapped 
on the quay or hunted down by Turkish irregulars throughout September. Most of the 
Levantines escaped physically unscathed with only the loss of property and businesses. 
Milton’s story in Paradise Lost amounts to a dirge for a forgotten world of 
cosmopolitanism and tolerance, but it is one that is sung with a very European voice. His 
narrative diverts from Housepian Dobkin’s only insofar as the Levantines are the subject 
of concern. Finding new primary sources and interviewing the few remaining Levantines 
of İzmir undoubtedly adds to our understanding of İzmir during the final days of the 
Ottoman Empire, but Milton’s overt romanticization of his subject matter overshadows 
what for the Greeks, Armenians, and Jews of the city was by all accounts an unmitigated 
disaster.  
Paradise Lost and Smyrna, 1922 then constitute the only book-length studies of 
the city’s destruction. Works directly concerned with the Greco-Turkish conflict, such as 
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Michael Llewellyn Smith’s Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922 (1973), 
mention the event, as İzmir was the administrative center of Greek rule in Anatolia, and 
its ruin effectively ended the war. Conversely, books concerned with the Greek and 
Turkish population exchanges after the war, such as Bruce Clark’s Twice a Stranger 
(2006) or Renee Hirschon’s Crossing the Aegean (2003), mention the İzmir fire and the 
exodus of the city’s minorities as a prelude to the forced emigration embodied in the 
Lausanne Treaty, but typically provide no further depth. The number of peer-reviewed 
articles in historical journals examining the İzmir fire largely mirrors that of the larger 
studies, with only a handful addressing the topic. Furthermore, their aim is typically to 
juxtapose the memory of the remaining survivors with the national historiographies of the 
Greek and Turkish states.24 And like Housepian Dobkin and Milton’s works, these other 
studies largely overlook the small yet growing American presence in the city, especially 
that of the YMCA.  
The small body of existing literature on İzmir’s destruction usually places the 
event in the immediate context of the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922. In early 1919, 
the victorious Entente powers of the First World War, searching to craft a new 
international system that would guarantee something of a durable European peace, had 
consequently delayed in addressing the equally daunting issue of partitioning the 
Ottoman Empire, to which Great Britain, France, Italy, and Greece all laid territorial 
claim. A series of overlapping wartime promises and bungled diplomatic proceedings 
allowed a brilliant Ottoman officer, Mustafa Kemal, to spearhead a nationalist revolution 
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in Anatolia, overturn the provisions of the 1920 Treaty of Lausanne, and establish the 
modern Republic of Turkey.  
While this narrative is truthful, it simplifies a more enduring issue endemic to the 
nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, and one in which missionary institutions such as the 
YMCA often played an unwitting role, namely, that of nationalism.25 The rationale 
behind the Greek occupation of İzmir and invasion of Western Anatolia, and indeed the 
Turks’ defense of it, did not follow the traditional pattern of colonial annexation with the 
aim of economic benefit or imperial aggrandizement. Rather, both the Greeks and the 
Turks were animated by fiercely irredentist ideologies in which Western Anatolia stood 
as sacred space dating from antiquity, exacerbating the violence of both the conflict as 
well as its tragic conclusion.   
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III. THE GREAT IDEA, TURKISM, AND THE GRECO-TURKISH WAR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Megali Idea 
Arguably the most consequential minority nationalist uprising against the 
Ottomans was the Greek War of Independence from 1821-1830, with Greece becoming 
an independent nation by the Treaty of Constantinople in 1832. The half-century 
preceding the revolt had seen a literary renaissance among the Greeks, spurred on by a 
wealthy diaspora merchant community in Europe, which became acquainted with the 
political philosophies of Rousseau and Bentham, and whose sons had the opportunity of 
studying in the best European universities.26 Out of this grew a movement among 
European intellectuals called Philhellenism, which was extraordinarily sympathetic to 
Greek national aspirations. A fashionable intellectual trend at the turn of the century, 
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exemplified by the writings of Lord Byron, the European Philhellenists helped to foster 
Hellenic nationalism. And while the Greek Renaissance was at first solely a peaceful 
literary and cultural movement, some of its participants began to form secret cells in 
Europe dedicated to revolution and the establishment of a Greek state.27 Even with the 
backing of European intellectuals, Greek independence remained a lofty goal, especially 
as the Ottoman state was beginning to reconstitute its hold over its domains during this 
era.  
After the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece in 1832, there remained the 
issue of how to forge a nation where one had not previously existed, not to mention the 
task of building a modern state. Even more critical was the question of the ethnic Greeks 
who remained outside the confines of the new state. Out of the situation in which only a 
third of all Greeks lived in Greece proper was born the idea that was to animate Greek 
nationalism until the destruction of the Ottoman Empire eighty years later, the Megali 
Idea.28 
“The unification of all areas of Greek settlement in the Near East within the bonds 
of a Greek state with its capital at Constantinople” was to remain the driving force of 
Greek foreign policy from its nascence until at least the conclusion of the Greco-Turkish 
War of 1920-1922. The “Great Idea” (Μεγάλη  Ιδέα) was a term coined by Ioannis 
Kolettis, who after independence emerged as a champion of the cause of ethnic Greeks 
living outside the kingdom against the direct subjects of the Greek crown.29 King Otto, 
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the Bavarian first monarch of Greece, utilized the Megali Idea as a means of 
consolidating his relatively unpopular rule, and by the time of the fin de siècle, the 
thought of a reconstituted Byzantine Empire was popular throughout all classes of Greek 
society.30   
Despite its popularity, the “Great Idea” was never fully systematized, and beyond 
agreement about its basic goal of bringing all Greeks into a single state, there was a great 
deal of disagreement. For example, whether the idea was hearkening back to ancient 
Hellas or the Byzantine era, in which significant Roman elements like Caesarism were 
present, was one issue of contention.31 And while as a political tool it was effective in 
galvanizing public opinion around Greek leaders, as a legitimate strategy of foreign 
policy it was fantastic at best, and even disastrous, evidenced by the thirty day Greco-
Turkish war of 1897. Historian Richard Clogg wrote of that war that, “in the words of 
one contemporary observer, Greece combined the appetites of a Russia with the resources 
of a Switzerland” and that “the clear lesson of the war was that the single-handed pursuit 
of the ‘Great Idea’ was lost.”32 
 It was with Eleftherios Venizelos’ coming to power in Greek politics that the 
objectives of the Megali Idea came close to fruition, but only after a bitter political 
struggle with the Greek monarch, Constantine XII, and with significant assistance from 
the victorious Entente Powers after World War One. The humiliation of the Greco-
Turkish War of 1897, coupled with the rise of the Committee of Union and Progress in 
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the neighboring Ottoman Empire in 1908, was the cause of great consternation within the 
Greek army, which clamored for its own reform and modernization program to match the 
menace of the seemingly renewed Ottoman state. In 1909, a group of dissident Greek 
officers formed the “Military League.” Intending to emulate the success of the Young 
Turks, in August they assembled outside Athens at Goudi and revolted.33 Political 
instability accompanied by continued agitation by military officials led to the rise of 
Venizelos, then the Prime Minister of Crete, who was called upon by the rebellious 
officers to assume control of the Military League. After Venizelos persuaded the Greek 
ruler, King George, to revise the Greek Constitution and implement a series of political 
reforms, he was chosen to represent Attica in the new parliament, and later was selected 
as Prime Minister by the recently-formed Liberal Party.34 
 The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the Treaties of London and Bucharest 
dramatically increased the size of the Greek Kingdom, augmenting its land mass by 70% 
and nearly doubling its population from roughly three million to almost five million 
people.35 The Ottoman State, which had taken on a veneer of strength and rejuvenation 
after the Young Turk Revolution, was clearly weak, and Greece’s massive territorial and 
population gains only served to whet the appetite of devotees to the Megali Idea. 
Furthermore, with the charismatic Venizelos at the helm, the advent of the First World 
War augured well for achieving the goal of a “Greater Greece” on both sides of the 
Aegean.  
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 The outbreak of World War One led to what has been called the “National 
Schism” in Greek history. King Constantine, who led the victorious Greek armies as 
crown prince in the Balkan Wars and therefore was encouraged to term himself 
“Constantine XII,” implying a succession to the last Byzantine emperor, was firm in his 
commitment to neutrality. The British and French, though, suspected him of furtively 
supporting the Central Powers.36 Venizelos, on the other hand, was eager to enter the war 
on the Entente’s side, though Bulgaria remained a great concern. Under the terms of the 
Greco-Serb Treaty of 1913, Greece promised to come to Serbia’s aid should it be 
attacked by Bulgaria. Though Bulgaria did not enter the war until 1915, Venizelos, 
perhaps anticipating its entry, had early on promised the Allies Greek support against 
Turkey in exchange for help against Bulgaria should it begin hostilities.37 Constantine 
held that the Greco-Serb Treaty was only applicable should Bulgaria unilaterally attack 
Serbia, and that in the context of a general European war it was invalid. Constantine 
maintained Greece’s neutrality, and twice forced Venizelos to resign during the course of 
the war. Finally, Constantine himself was forced to abdicate under Entente pressure in 
1917, and with Venizelos back in charge, Greece entered the war on the Allied side the 
same year. 
 Upon the conclusion of the First World War and entering the post-war settlement, 
the aims of the Megali Idea were for the first time largely achievable. The territorial gains 
of the Balkan Wars and the leadership of Venizelos, in the words of Lloyd George “the 
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greatest Greek statesman since Pericles,” both signaled that additional gains in the 
western littoral of Asia Minor and Thrace, and perhaps even İstanbul itself, were 
possible.38 And whereas previously the Kingdom had not had the benefit of significant 
Great Power assistance to advance the cause of the Great Idea, Venizelos’ unwavering 
wartime commitment to the Entente boded well for Greece as the Allies set to the task of 
partitioning the Ottoman domains. 
Evolution of Turkish Nationalism 
 With the Megali Idea, Greek nationalists were able to maintain relative unity in 
the simplicity of its purpose; Turkish nationalism offers an altogether different story. 
Indeed, a specifically “Turkish” nationalism arrived only in the final years of the 
empire’s life. For centuries, the justifying principle of the Ottoman state had been the 
preservation of orthodox Sunni Islam, and if the subjects of the Sultan identified with 
anything beyond their respective locales, it would have been their religious community, 
and ultimately the Sultan himself. The rise of minority nationalisms and the ever-growing 
influence of Europe had spawned the reform movements, but after several decades, even 
reform-minded civil and military servants had tired of the ineffectual, overbearing, and 
top-down approach of the Ottoman government.  
  In 1904, the Ottoman Tatar Yusuf Akçura published an influential essay, “Three 
Types of Policy,” in the Cairo journal Türk, reviewing the development of the empire’s 
political philosophies over the previous century. The first political ideology Akçura 
enumerated was Ottomanism, which to greater or lesser degrees remained the 
predominant political philosophy over the course of the nineteenth century. The classical 
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form of Ottoman governance was the millet system, in which the dhimmis, or non-
Muslim monotheists, of the empire were divided into ecclesiastical communities whose 
head, the millet-başı, reported directly to the Sultan. Provided that these religious 
communities swore allegiance to the Sultan and submitted to a higher rate of taxation 
than that which their Muslim counterparts paid, they were largely left alone to govern 
their own communal affairs.39 While the millet system had for the first few centuries of 
the Ottoman Empire functioned rather effectively, both the Serb Uprising of 1804 and the 
establishment of the Kingdom of Greece in 1832 demonstrated to the Turks that it was no 
longer suited to cope with the new nationalist ideas emanating from Europe.  
 The Ottoman response to both the ever-growing military and economic 
superiority of Europe, as well as the increasing threat posed by separatist-minded 
members of the empire millets, was a series of societal reforms begun in 1839 known 
collectively as the Tanzimat, which culminated in the Ottoman Constitution of 1876. The 
most notable, if not consequential, of these reforms for the empire’s minorities was the 
1856 Reform Decree, which conferred universal equality for all Ottoman citizens 
regardless of religion, a direct contravening of both Qur’anic law and longstanding 
historical precedent.40 The edict’s aim was twofold. First, improving the lot of Ottoman 
Christians would ostensibly deny European powers a pretext for interfering in Ottoman 
affairs, as had been the case with the recent Crimean War. More importantly, by kindling 
a new idea of citizenship and devotion to the state rather than to the recent idea of 
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“nation,” the reformers sought to stem the rising nationalist tide amongst the millets, the 
gravest intellectual challenge to Ottoman rule. And while the intellectual underpinnings 
of Ottomanism ranged from religiously conservative, as shown by the Young Ottoman 
movement of the 1860s, to openly modernist, as advocated by the members of the Young 
Turk Committee of Union and Progress, the idea of constitutionalism and at least nominal 
equality of all Ottoman subjects remained the predominant ideology of the empire until 
its end in 1923.41  
 The second great ideological current outlined by Akçura was pan-Islam, which 
followed the 1860s Young Ottoman movement and in many respects resembled 
conservative Ottomanism. The notion of Ittihad-i Islam, or Islamic unity, was not a new 
idea in Muslim intellectual circles, and, especially during the second half of his reign, 
Sultan Abdülhamid II used this notion to solidify his power. The Tanzimat project was 
born of a middle-class, bureaucratic, and largely secular mindset, despite the Young 
Ottomans’ piety. Constitutionalism and a parliamentary system failed to grasp the 
imagination of the common Muslim, whose traditional loyalty was to Islam and the 
Sultan, and of the minorities, who by the time of Abdülhamid’s reign had their own ideas 
of nation, which had little to do with devotion to an Ottoman fatherland. With the 
dismissal and exile of Grand Vizier Midhat Paşa in 1876, the Tanzimat movement lost 
much of its steam, and Hamidian pan-Islam held sway until the appearance of the Young 
Turks in the early twentieth century.  
 Abdülhamid’s reign, despite its notoriety as an era of reaction and regression, in 
many ways extended the work of the Tanzimat by continuing “modernization” on a 
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technical and administrative level.42 Where Abdülhamid differed from the program was 
in his approach to western political institutions, which he felt had caused problems for 
previous Sultans and in which he had no interest, as evidenced by his suspension of the 
Ottoman Constitution and his refusal to reinstate it until 1908.43 Fearing continued 
European colonialism, and especially the creeping czarist domination of Central Asia and 
the Caucasus, he reclaimed the title of caliph, which had been used only sporadically by 
previous sultans, and almost never in a political sense. In this way, he appealed to all 
Muslims, not just Ottoman subjects or Turks, against Christian aggression in the Islamic 
world.44 Abdülhamid’s call for unity under the caliphate was popular outside the empire: 
in British India, Russian Central Asia, and French North Africa. On the other hand, 
strengthening the Palace and ulema left the Ottomanist-minded bureaucrats and military 
officials of the Porte disaffected.45 
 Having reviewed Ottomanism and pan-Islamism, Akçura then explained what he 
understood to represent the best “policy” for preserving the Ottoman Empire and moving 
it into the modern world: Turkism. Ottomanism had been a “waste of time,” and 
Abdülhamid’s pan-Islamism had so exacerbated tensions between Muslim and Christian, 
exemplified best by the 1894-1896 Armenian massacres, that minority allegiance to the 
Ottoman state was a lost cause. Most millets had their own national plans anyway. The 
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solution was to look to Central Asia and to establish a pan-Turkic state between 
Caucasian Europe and Sinic East Asia with the Ottoman Empire as its titular head. 
 The Ottomanism of the Young Turks, Islamism of Abdülhamid, and Turanism of 
Yusuf Akçura vied with one another for supremacy on the eve of the First World War. 
Despite intellectuals’ borrowing from alternate ideologies in formulating their ideas, 
there was no attempt at a synthesis until the appearance of Ziya Gökalp, a thinker who 
was to have a great influence upon the early Kemalist Republic. What Gökalp proposed 
was an amalgamation of Turkism, Islamism, and Modernism in which “the foregoing 
principle of our social policy will be this: to be of the Turkish nation, of the Islamic 
religion, and of European civilization.”46 The term “civilization” is important. Gökalp 
differentiated between culture (hars), “the harmonious whole of the…aspects of the life 
of a single nation,” and civilization (medeniyet), “a mutually shared whole of the social 
lives of many nations situated on the same continent.”47 Civilization stood above the 
nation, and was therefore transferable; culture, on the other hand, was a product of it, and 
could not be transposed onto another people group. The empire could partake in the 
civilization of Europe, but its culture had to remain Islamic. The Ottomans were moving 
from the religious society of the umma to the cultural society of the nation 
(millet).48Although religion would certainly remain part of the nation’s identity, Islam 
and the Sultan would no longer be the primary source of allegiance.  
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 The much-discussed “Eastern Question” amounted then to a century and a half 
long crisis for the Ottoman Turks, and the various ideologies propagated by Ottoman 
intellectuals; Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, and Turkism were the indigenous answers to 
what was nominally a diplomatic question, but in actuality one of survival. Since Küçük 
Kaynarca, the Ottomans’ peripheral domains had steadily been lost to annexation or the 
independence of Christian minorities. Even the Arabs, though largely fellow Muslims, 
were by the last quarter of the century developing both a pan-Arab nationalism based 
upon a shared language and history (qawmiyya), and also regional ones emphasizing 
specific locales like Syria, Egypt, and Iraq (wataniyya). Europe, along with the minorities 
it sheltered, dominated the economic life of the empire through the capitulations. Even 
more unbearable than humiliation at the hands of Europe was that at the hands of former 
subjects, losing Albania, Macedonia, and Thrace to the Balkan League of Serbia, 
Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece during the First Balkan War. With Ottomanism dead 
and pan-Islamism failing to retain the allegiance of even the Arabs, a variant of Turkism 
became something of a fait accompli.49 
Onset of the Greco-Turkish War 
 The Greeks’ Megali Idea and the Turkism of the late Ottomans need not have 
come into conflict, and it appears that during the span of the Great War, Turkish and 
Greek policies were oriented in different directions.50 Venizelos’ concern was Bulgaria, 
not the Ottomans, and he only offered to join the fight against the Turks in exchange for 
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Allied support against a Bulgarian attack. To be sure, Thrace, western Asia Minor, and 
especially İstanbul were the ultimate ends of the Megali Idea. But assessing it now, 
Venizelos’ request appears to be a defensive one aimed at ensuring that Salonika would 
not fall to what many felt was a superior Bulgarian military.51 Likewise, after the collapse 
of the czarist regime and Russian withdrawal from the war, an Ottoman drive to the east 
and the establishment of a pan-Turkic state finally emerged as a viable option, especially 
with eastern Anatolia almost completely rid of Armenians.  Following the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk, Enver Paşa, the Ottoman Minister of War, created the “Army of Islam,” a 
solely Turkish regiment under his personal command, and moved into the Caucasus, an 
action of great consequence for the future establishment of the Republic of Turkey.52 
 It was only after the war that Greek and Turkish interests would come into 
conflict, and did so largely because of the actions in the east of the victorious Entente. 
The British had spurred an Arab revolt, and the Sykes-Picot Agreement had delineated 
the spheres of influence that would later become the British and French mandates over 
the Arabs. Anatolia was another matter. The 1915 Treaty of London, intended to sway 
the Italians from their longstanding “Triple Alliance” with Germany and Austria-
Hungary, mentioned that in the case of a post-war partition of Asia Minor, “a 
maintenance of equilibrium” would have to be established in the eastern Mediterranean, 
and that Italy would receive a “just share” of the region around the province of Antalya.53  
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 Though wartime allies, the French and British had long pursued antagonistic 
policies in the Arab world, and, as early as 1917, the British were searching out other 
potential allies in the region. Venizelos, given his early and unwavering commitment to 
the Allied cause during the war, had by its end emerged as just the long-term ally the 
British sought. After the war, a group of philhellenes in the British Foreign Office, 
historian and polymath Arnold Toynbee among them, actively promoted a “Greater 
Greece” as Britain’s proxy in the eastern Mediterranean.54 Prime Minister David Lloyd 
George agreed, especially as British troops, in the process of decommissioning and tied 
down in Palestine and Mesopotamia, as well as Iran and the Caucasus, would not have 
been available for further action should the need have arisen. Finally, in 1915, Sir 
Edward Grey had offered Venizelos large portions of western Anatolia in exchange for 
Greece joining the conflict, though this was unknown to the other participants at Paris 
until late in its proceedings.55 
 Just as Great Britain had promised Palestine to both the Arabs and Zionists, 
portions of western Asia Minor to which the Greeks laid claim and which were offered to 
Greece by Grey were by the 1915 Treaty of London allotted to Italy.56 Under the 
condition of the Mudros Armistice, the Allies were given the right to intervene militarily 
in Anatolia should a state of “unrest” come to pass.57 And while this was clearly aimed at 
preventing Turkish reprisals against the Armenians in eastern vilayets, Venizelos used 
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this as an opportunity to “protect” ethnic Greeks in western Turkey. In January of 1919, 
Venizelos petitioned the Supreme War Council to allow him to move two Greek 
divisions from Macedonia and one from the Ukraine, where they were engaged in anti-
Bolshevik maneuvers, to Turkey.58 
 After requesting the troop redeployments, on Feb. 3, Venizelos appeared before 
the Council of Ten, laying out Greek territorial claims in Northern Epirus, the Aegean 
Islands, Thrace, and finally Asia Minor.59 Based upon “the principle that no territory 
previously belonging to Turkey could remain part of the Ottoman Empire unless it 
contained an absolute majority of Turks,” his claims were fully in the spirit of the Megali 
Idea. Uncertain of their military capabilities in Anatolia and eager to accommodate 
Venizelos after his help during the war, the Council proposed a committee to address the 
Greek claims.60 
 Italy, frustrated by its inability to come to a separate agreement with Greece and 
fearful that the Council of Four was going to award Greece its Anatolian claims, seized 
Antalya in March of 1919, before the Commission’s report was readied, and began a 
sequence of landings and withdrawals, ostensibly to “maintain order” under the armistice, 
but obviously as a preparation for military action should the Greeks have been allowed to 
land in the littoral. Lloyd George and Clemenceau proposed giving Italy a mandate in 
Anatolia that would border the Greek, Constantinople, and Armenian mandates, to which 
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both Wilson and Venizelos objected; the Italians walked out of the Conference, not to 
return until May 5.  In the meantime, Italy continued to strengthen its military presence in 
the eastern Mediterranean.61 
 Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau were incensed at the Italian intransigence 
and aggression that threatened to scuttle the peace deliberations. After Clemenceau 
reported that the Italians had stationed seven battleships off İzmir, Wilson lamented that 
constitutionally he was unable to commit troops, the United States having never declared 
war on the Ottoman Empire, and proposed cutting off American credit to the Italians as a 
means of halting their actions. Lloyd George responded by pointing out the futility of any 
punitive action short of military force, and declared that British admirals were to be 
instructed to allow Venizelos to occupy İzmir. The next day the Greek leader was told to 
begin moving his troops from Macedonia and to prepare for a landing at İzmir. On May 
15, 1919, the Greek army occupied the city with no Turkish or Italian counter-maneuvers.   
 While Venizelos was taking the first steps to fulfilling the century-old Megali 
Idea, the Ottoman government could do little but protest, warning that a Greek 
occupation of western Anatolia was a betrayal of both the Turks and the principles of 
Wilsonianism, and would create “another Macedonia” in Asia Minor.62 Prescient 
American observers, such as Admiral Mark Bristol and Dr. Alexander MacLachlan, the 
President of the College of İzmir, understood this as well, the latter noting that the Greeks 
were the least acceptable people to the Turks to be in Asia Minor, and that Wilson’s 
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consenting to the landing had badly damaged America’s reputation with the Turks.63 On 
May 5, the Ottoman Ministry of War instructed Mustafa Kemal to head east, ostensibly to 
decommission the armies Enver Paşa moved to the Caucasus for his pan-Turkic drive 
into Central Asia, but fully expected him to begin a resistance movement.64 Kemal 
arrived at Samsun just four days after the Greek landing, and immediately set to 
reorganizing the eastern forces under his command.   
 The army was not the only institution sympathetic to resisting after the war. In 
1915, Enver had established the Teşkilat-i Mahusa, or “Special Organization,” which he 
used as his shock troops in both suppressing nationalist sentiment among the remaining 
minorities during the war, which with the Armenians meant their mass deportation and 
death, and spreading anti-western propaganda in French and British colonies. There also 
was the Karakol, or “The Guard,” which was a CUP unit designed to protect its members 
against reprisals by the Armenians, and which began smuggling Unionist members, as 
well as weapons and ammunition, out of İstanbul to Anatolia in the days after the 
armistice.65 Alarmed at the Greek invasion, rumors of independent Armenian and 
Kurdish states, as well as the remaining British troops in the Caucasus, local groups 
termed “Societies for the Defense of Rights” appeared first in Thrace and around İzmir 
and later in eastern Anatolia. Finally, whereas the Sultan prostrated himself before the 
French and British to protect his throne, a significant percentage of the government 
remained nationalistic and sympathetic to Kemal’s efforts. 
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 With Kemal’s “Amasya Circular” declaring the Sultan to be a prisoner of the 
Allies and therefore unable to work in the best interests of the Turkish people, the Sultan 
immediately recalled Kemal to İstanbul, undoubtedly at the behest of the Entente. He 
then resigned his post in the Ottoman army, and began organizing what was to become a 
new government. The local “Defense of Rights” organizations sent elected 
representatives to Erzurum and Sivas in the late summer and early fall of 1919, out of 
which the “National Pact” of the last Ottoman Parliament was drawn and which unified 
the Defense of Rights organizations, resulting in the “Association for the Defense of the 
Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia.” The most important of the National Pact’s demands 
was Article VI, which asserted complete independence for the country and freedom from 
economic, judicial, and political interference.66  
 When the Ottoman parliament adopted the National Pact in early 1920, the Allies 
occupied İstanbul, and exiled a number of nationalist MPs to Malta, while the Sultan 
dissolved the last Ottoman parliament on April 11.67 Kemal’s “Grand National 
Congress,” which met for the first time on April 23 in Ankara, would eventually become 
the new Turkish government.68 
 Having consolidated and “cleansed” İzmir of Turks, Venizelos’ Greek army 
awaited the coming treaty that would deliver to them the fulfillment of the Megali Idea, 
minus İstanbul. Fearing the rebel government at Ankara, Lloyd George rushed to 
complete an eastern settlement, which was signed at Sèvres in August.  The Greek army 
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received permission from the Supreme War Council to go on the offensive in July. By 
August, when the first offensive was finished, it had occupied all of western Asian Minor 
in a defensive perimeter around İzmir, marking the beginning of the Greco-Turkish 
War.69  
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IV. THE YMCA IN ANATOLIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beginnings 
 Nationalist warfare presented a two-fold challenge to American missionary 
institutions, especially one like the YMCA that lacked the resources accompanying a 
long-standing presence in the region. There first was the rather straightforward issue of 
how to carry on mission work during a time of war, despite İzmir’s distance from the 
actual fields of battle in central Anatolia. Second, and perhaps more problematic, was the 
question of how to effectively spread the message and values of Protestant Christianity in 
an environment where religious identification, long the primary marker of social 
difference in the Ottoman world, had largely been subsumed under or even replaced with 
the notion of nationality.  
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 The initial spread of the YMCA movement abroad was a mostly decentralized 
affair, in which missionaries and their students would form an association, often attached 
to a previously established missionary school or college, but would otherwise remain 
unconnected to the North American YMCA. Europe saw its first YMCAs founded by 
Americans in the 1880s, with the establishment of Berlin’s Christlicher Verein Junger 
Männer in 1883 by Friedrich von Schlümbach and a Paris association in 1887 by 
Franklin Gaylord.70 By the end of the decade, several dozen associations had sprung up 
outside of Europe, and outside of any direct oversight by the American YMCA. In the 
Islamic world specifically, there were six associations in what is now Syria, one in Persia, 
and eleven in “Asiatic Turkey.”71  
 Despite the YMCA’s presence in Turkey, American involvement in the Ottoman 
YMCAs remained negligible until the eve of the First World War, and even then it was 
only tenuously established. The long reign of Abdülhamid II, who correctly suspected 
western missionaries of at least tacitly supporting separatist aspirations among the 
Ottoman minorities, especially the Armenians, presented even further obstacles to 
missionary groups aspiring to proselytize within the empire.72 Indeed, Luther Wishard, 
whose two-year world tour from 1888-1891gave birth to the first American-sponsored 
YMCA “secretaries” abroad, only tepidly endorsed the association’s viability in much of 
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the Ottoman world, even declaring Palestine, the Promised Land, to be a “most 
unpromising” environment for the American YMCA to begin work. 73  
 It was only with the short-lived liberalization of the Young Turk Revolution in 
1908 that the American YMCA was able to begin substantial foreign work in the 
Ottoman Empire. An American advisory committee was formed in İstanbul the same 
year, and the first foreign secretaries were sent to Egypt and Palestine the following one. 
In 1910, the first salaried American YMCA representatives, Ernst O. Jacob and Darius A. 
Davis, arrived in the empire, respectively, as “traveling secretary” for the Levant and 
secretary at İstanbul.74 Dirk Johannes Van Bommel, a Dutch national who had studied at 
the YMCA College in Springfield, MA, arrived in İstanbul in 1912 as Davis’ assistant.75 
 The success of Davis and Van Bommel at the Pera (Beyoğlu) Branch YMCA in 
its early years was modest. Although late-Ottoman İstanbul had a population of roughly 
five hundred thousand Greeks and Armenians, who were the primary target of the 
western missionaries’ work, only a few months before the outbreak of World War One, 
the Pera Branch had a mere five hundred active members, with an equal number enrolled 
in evening foreign language classes. The numbers sufficed though, or enough promise 
was foreseen for the city, for the YMCA’s International Committee to offer a $75,000 
grant to purchase a property at No. 40 Rue Cabristan, next to the American Embassy.76 
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 The First World War brought a drastic curtailment of the association’s activities 
in İstanbul. Even before the Entente declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire following 
the Oct. 28 Turco-German bombardment of the Russian Black Sea coast, the Pera Branch 
was hemorrhaging members who were either entering military service or simply fleeing 
the city. Throughout Europe, the YMCA moved to relief work and service to prisoners of 
war, which prompted both Jacob and Davis to transfer to the Western Front.77 Upon the 
United States’ entry into the war in 1917, and the concomitant severance of diplomatic 
relations with the Ottoman Empire, the Pera Branch building was rented to the Dutch 
YMCA Legation to keep the property in the organization, with Van Bommel, a citizen of 
the Netherlands, remaining to supervise the facility.78 
 The İzmir YMCA began as an outgrowth of the association’s relief work during 
and after the war. John Mott, the long-serving head of the American YMCA, had visited 
the city in 1911, meeting with the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan and receiving an 
exhortation from the city’s luminaries to send a foreign secretary to the city. But the near 
constant state of war in the Ottoman Empire from the time of the YMCA’s arrival 
prevented it from officially expanding its efforts to İzmir. At the conclusion of the Great 
War, E.C. Jenkins, John Mott’s private secretary and the executive of the YMCA’s 
Foreign Work Department, promised E.O. Jacob that the organization was committed to 
expanding its presence in Anatolia to the city. In 1919, following his war-time work in 
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Germany and a stay in the United States, Jacob was assigned as General Secretary at 
İzmir, and promised a future staff of at least two American associates to assist him.79 
 That İzmir would have received such notice as a potential field for YMCA foreign 
work is understandable. Incorporated into the empire in 1425 from the emirate of the 
Aydınoğlus, a Turkoman rival to the House of Osman in the early centuries of the Turkic 
conquest of Anatolia and the Balkans, İzmir at first largely stagnated during the several 
centuries of Ottoman rule, lacking the historical significance of cities such as Aleppo and 
İstanbul.80 The city remained a small center of piratical activity until the great maritime 
powers of the sixteenth century, primarily Britain and Holland, began using it as the main 
conduit for Iranian silk making its way to Europe.81 Thereafter, İzmir grew as an 
economic hub between East and West, with European merchants and traders, and their 
Ottoman Greek, Armenian, and Jewish counterparts, dominating the economic life of the 
city.82 A town of around five thousand persons at the time of the Ottoman conquest, the 
city grew to two hundred thousand by the fin de siècle, with at least a substantial minority 
of Greek and Armenian inhabitants making it an attractive site for the YMCA’s foreign 
work.83 
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 Not only did İzmir have a large population of Ottoman Christians to be served, 
but because of its economic significance, the city had for a long time been home to a 
great many Europeans, the “Levantines.” There also was a small American presence from 
which a nascent missionary enterprise could draw financial and logistical support. 
Indeed, İzmir was the entry point for Pliny Fisk and Levi Parsons, the first American 
Board missionaries to the Ottoman Empire, who went to the city to learn modern Greek. 
The city later became a base of operations for Fisk and Parsons before they moved on to 
work among the Christian Arabs in Palestine and Syria.84 The American Board 
subsequently made İzmir one of its main centers in Anatolia, and later founded the 
principal educational institutions of the city, with the Collegiate Institute for Girls 
opening in 1881 and the International College in 1902.85 Likewise, because of its 
importance as an economic center, İzmir was the site of the first business contacts 
between the Unites States and the Ottoman Empire, with American merchant vessels 
arriving in İzmir as early as the 1780s, some twenty years before they would enter 
İstanbul.86 Several American businesses, such as the American Tobacco Company, the 
MacAndrew and Forbes licorice company, Singer Sewing Machines, and Standard Oil, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
83 Kırlı, “Forgetting the Smyrna Fire,” 25. The precise demographics of İzmir at the conclusion of the First 
World War are almost impossible to ascertain. For example, the 1921 report by E.O. Jacob estimated the 
city’s population to be roughly 500,000 These statistics were an issue of contention at the time of the Greek 
occupation of the city, with Venizelos being charged with inflating the number of Greeks in western 
Anatolia, thereby justifying its annexation by the Kingdom of Greece on Wilsonian principles of ethnic 
self-determination.  This demographic debate has continued amongst historians, primarily in the context of 
the genocide question, and specifying exactly how many Ottoman Greeks and Armenians perished between 
1915 and 1922.   
 
84 James L. Barton, Daybreak in Turkey (Boston: The Pilgrim’s Press, 1908), 120.  
 
85 Leon Arpee, “A Century of Armenian Protestantism,” Church History Vol. 5, No. 2 (June, 1936): 154.   
 
86 Robert L. Daniel, “American Influences in the Near East Before 1851,” American Quarterly Vol. 16, No. 
1 (Spring, 1964): 72.  
43 
 
 
 
would move into the city over the next century.87 Finally, and again because of its 
economic significance, İzmir represented the initial locale of diplomatic relations 
between the United States and the Ottomans, with the first American consulate in the 
empire opening in 1824.  
 It is therefore unsurprising that the YMCA received a great deal of 
encouragement when attempting to re-establish itself in the Ottoman Empire after the 
war. James L. Barton, the Foreign Secretary of the American Board, wrote Jacob upon 
his appointment to İzmir that “there is a large field in Turkey for the work of the YMCA, 
and that, too, in work that will not be done by any other organization.”88 The American 
Consul-General of İzmir, George Horton, similarly wrote to John Mott that the YMCA, 
“in the short time that it has been here, working under serious limitations, has proved that 
there is a big demand for it, and that its work is ripe to be done.”89 Even the Greek 
Orthodox Metropolitan of İzmir, Chrysostomos Kalafatis, reminded Mott of his 1911 
visit to İzmir, and inquired as to when the city would finally get its “turn” with a 
YMCA.90   
 That a Greek Orthodox clergyman would be calling for an American Protestant 
missionary institution to establish work in his domains is indicative both of the changes 
in Eastern Christian perceptions of American missionaries, and also of the types of 
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practices classified as evangelism. Pliny Fisk, the American Board pioneer of missions in 
the Ottoman Empire, had pushed for a strong missionary presence among the Greeks. 
Especially after Greece won its independence from the Ottomans in 1832, the Hellenic 
world appeared to offer an attractive prospect for mission work. The American Board did 
subsequently make a whole-hearted attempt at spreading its Congregationalist brand of 
Protestantism in Greece during the first several decades of the Kingdom’s existence, but 
it chose to discontinue the mission in 1861, noting that after having dedicated almost 
thirty clergy to the country, as well as having distributed a million religious tracts and 
almost two hundred thousand modern Greek New Testaments, not even ten persons had 
convincingly imbibed Protestantism.91 
 The Greek reluctance to abandon Orthodoxy is understandable given their history 
under Turkish rule. During the era of Ottoman domination in which religion, via the 
millet system, had been the organizing principle of society, Orthodoxy was what bound 
together the millet-i Rum scattered throughout the diaspora of the empire. Even with 
Greek independence, there long remained a larger number of Hellenes outside of the 
borders of the kingdom than within, almost all of whom resided in the confines of the 
Ottoman Empire. Especially as the Megali Idea grew in popularity over the nineteenth 
century, few Greeks were prepared to forsake what had long been the primary marker of 
their identity.    
 The Orthodox were not exceptional. The clergy of the Armenian Apostolic 
Christians, among whom the American Board had perhaps its greatest successes during 
its tenure in the Ottoman Empire, were initially violently opposed to the tenets of 
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Reformed Christianity.92 Likewise, the American Board’s mission to proselytize among 
the Syrian Maronites met fierce resistance until the 1860s, with the Maronite hierarchy 
threatening to excommunicate anyone who consorted with the American evangelists.93 
The clergy among the Egyptian Copts were similarly adamant in their resistance to the 
American Presbyterians who set out to revive with the Gospel what they perceived to be 
a moribund faith.94  
 Two related shifts, one in missionary policy and the other in theology, largely 
account for the change in perception of the Eastern Christian clergy toward western 
missionaries. The first was the simple, stark fact that the conversion numbers, especially 
juxtaposed with the statistics for missionaries’ other pursuits such as building hospitals 
and schools, were weak.95 If the “evangelization of the world in this generation” were 
actually to come to pass, a different strategy than simply preaching the Gospel was 
needed to reach the unconverted.96  
 Around the same time that the American missionaries abroad were coming to the 
recognition that unadulterated evangelism in its classical sense was ineffective, a new 
theological movement at home was transforming American Christianity in a way that 
would fundamentally alter what evangelism meant. The “Social Gospel” of the late 
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has been succinctly described by one historian as 
the “ethicizing of Protestantism.”  Issues of theology were de-emphasized, if not outright 
ignored, with great value concomitantly placed on social activism.97 Rather than splitting 
hairs over issues of orthodoxy, correct forms of church government, and individual 
salvation, the Social Gospel movement set itself to addressing societal, collective ills, 
such as abolishing child labor, providing relief for the unemployed, improving the lot of 
industrial workers, and lifting the moral standards of American society, all goals that 
mirrored the Progressive milieu in which it arose. Meliorist and theologically modernist, 
the Social Gospel, along with the “higher” Biblical criticism emanating from Germany, 
challenged traditional understandings of Protestant Christianity, and would have a 
significant impact upon the missionary movement abroad, whose work was gradually 
transformed from the traditional goal of proselytism to more worldly forms of service: 
education, providing health care, and inculcating the values of modern democratic 
societies. 
 In many respects, the “Four-fold Program” of the YMCA adopted in 1866, “the 
improvement of the spiritual, mental, social, and physical condition of young men,” 
prefigured some of the aims of the Social Gospel. Because the YMCA was a Christian 
institution, religious activities such as Bible studies were from the first an aspect of its 
programming. On the other hand, the organization was also interdenominational, and not 
being under the supervision of any particular church body, it would encourage its 
members to seek out a church, where more extensive religious instruction could occur. 
Over time, the religious aspect of the Four-fold Program slowly atrophied, with its 
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physical and character-building efforts becoming the markers by which the association 
was known. By the early 1900s, most American YMCAs had drastically reduced their 
overtly religious work, opting instead to devote their resources to more popular athletic 
and physical health programs.98  
 The theological transition from traditionalist orthodoxy to modernist Social 
Gospel, coupled with the recognition of the inefficacy of traditional evangelism, were 
what accounted for the change in missionary tactics in the second half of the nineteenth 
century and first half of the twentieth, and the consequent softening of attitude towards 
the YMCA by not only non-Protestant Christians in the Ottoman World, but even by non-
Christians farther east in the Indic and Sinic realms.99 When a YMCA secretary could 
write, “The Greek and Armenian Churches are practically on their knees before us, 
asking us to establish our work throughout all the regions where they are supreme,” it 
was clear that the relationship between Eastern Christians and Western missionaries had 
undergone a significant transformation since the inception of missionary work a hundred 
years earlier. This led D.A. Davis, the post-war administrative secretary for Turkey, to 
“firmly believe there is a possibility for starting a real evangelical movement in the Greek 
Church.”100  
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The İzmir Association 
When E.O. Jacob began his employment at İzmir in October of 1920, initiating 
the International Committee’s direct supervision of the city’s YMCA, the association had 
already been doing humanitarian work, and was slowly attempting to branch out into 
other forms of service.101 For example, during the summer of 1920, with the assistance of 
both İzmir’s Greek administration and the American Consul George Horton, the 
organization established a camp outside the city to instruct its youth in agricultural 
techniques.102 The İzmir YMCA also established a “Christian Citizenship Training 
Program” in one of the prominent Greek schools of the city. The citizenship program was 
an extension of the Four-fold Program adapted for boys, combining devotional, athletic, 
and educational activities for its participants.103 By the end of 1920, the citizenship 
program had doubled in size, with others clamoring to be allowed to participate.104  
 The agricultural and citizenship program represented the İzmir YMCA’s most 
visible work and successes, but they differed from the day-to-day work of the association. 
In June of 1921, eight months after Jacob began his tenure in the city, he penned reports 
that both summarized the association’s work and detailed the constraints under which it 
was operating. Concerning “physical work,” the heart of most YMCAs’ activities, he 
lamented that due to the lack of building and proper space it was “practically impossible 
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in the sense in which we think of such work at home.”105 Recreational activities such as 
billiards, thrice-weekly “motion pictures,” and tea rooms, none of which generated 
significant revenue for the association, were popular due to the fact that most of the 
members were below the age of twenty, a great portion of the city’s male population 
having been mobilized after the resumption of the Greek offensive in the Aydın province. 
 However, in common with most American missionary institutions of its time, the 
İzmir YMCA’s educational work constituted its greatest achievement. The association 
maintained a thousand-volume library, and subscribed to several dozen periodicals and 
daily newspapers in several languages. It also offered English and French classes on a 
regular basis, in which enrollment had doubled between 1920 and 1921. Jacob also 
contemplated expanding topically to include courses in mathematics, sciences, and 
business. Cultural activities such as music lessons and amateur drama were also part of 
the programming, though they were not as popular as the limited academic coursework it 
offered. Work of a markedly religious nature remained confined to a weekly Bible study 
session, the attendance at which was paltry compared with the academic and recreational 
activities.106  
The YMCA’s mission to İzmir before 1923, then, largely conforms to the 
historical patterns of both American Christian missions in general and the organization 
itself in particular. In contrast with the early years of the YMCA, both its domestic and 
foreign work, while born in a milieu of populist revivalism, had over time grown 
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decidedly less evangelistic and came to emphasize character-building, as exemplified by 
its Four-fold Program and the “Boys’ Work” of the Christian Citizenship Training 
Program, physical work, and education. And while the organization insisted on remaining 
at least nominally Christian and its foreign secretaries still spoke the language of 
proselytism and conversion, the great majority of its efforts became of a non-religious 
nature, even if still cloaked with the veneer of spreading the Gospel.107 This progression 
substantially mirrored that of other American missionary institutions, best exemplified by 
the American Board, which began its pursuits with the goal of converting the world’s 
non-Christians, which in the face of diminishing returns on its evangelistic efforts, shifted 
the focus of the mission to social and educational work, albeit done all in the name of 
Christ.108 
 The success of the first agricultural camp and the citizenship program, coupled 
with increasing membership numbers and attendance at the association’s language classes 
and weekly civic lectures and a moderately successful fundraising drive amongst İzmir’s 
businessmen, foretold the beginning of a small but stable YMCA in 1921. Despite the 
fact that it remained paralyzed in expanding its physical work, it was not running deficits, 
and was well-equipped to maintain the activities it had developed since the end of the 
war. Furthermore, the association had been able to maintain friendly relations with the 
city’s Greek and Armenian clergy, and retained the strong support of both the U.S. 
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Consul-General Horton and the Greek High Commissioner Sterghiades. Even Greek 
nationalists were behind the association, with the Athens daily Nea Hellas stating that, 
“In a country where neither Church, Government, nor Society in general take care of the 
young people we think that America helps Hellenism by maintaining and 
developing―under its own management―the work of the Y.M.C.A.”109  
 Despite Jacob’s private reservations about the viability of not only the İzmir 
association, but also the YMCA movement in Turkey in general, the initial success of the 
İzmir branch prompted the International Committee to follow through on its promise to 
provide an additional American secretary at İzmir.110 On account of the ongoing war in 
Anatolia, those under the age of eighteen constituted the principle demographic that the 
association was serving, making “boys’ work” the organization’s most attractive prospect 
for future work. By early 1922, the International Committee had settled on Asa K. 
Jennings, a man of great consequence in both the history of İzmir and of the YMCA’s 
foreign work, as its next secretary in the city to assist Jacob with boys’ work.111 
 An ordained Methodist minister originally from Utica, NY, Jennings at the time 
of his assignment to İzmir had for the past fifteen years been employed as a YMCA 
secretary in both North America and Europe. Like Jacob, Jennings spent the war years in 
Europe, doing relief work first in France and later in Moravia. After the war, he served in 
the United States as a national boys’ work secretary, and later returned to the newly 
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created Czechoslovakia, heading the YMCA at Budĕjovice in Bohemia. Because the 
post-war Czechoslovak YMCAs were transitioning from foreign to native secretaries to 
run their work, Jennings was soon to be out of a job, and consequently was scheduled to 
transfer to İzmir at the end of the summer of 1922.112 
 Interestingly, given the push for expanded boys’ work requiring another secretary 
and the seeming enthusiasm for the YMCA amongst the religious and civic leaders of 
İzmir, there is little documentary evidence to suggest that the conflict between the Greeks 
and nationalist Turks was something of which the association was conscious, or which it 
foresaw interrupting its activities. Jacob remained less than sanguine about the long-term 
prospects of the association, privately noting after his first year in the city that, “All 
hopes are centred on the conclusion of peace between the Greeks and Turks.” He alone 
seems to have had doubts, and even he scarcely mentioned the war in his official reports, 
with finances, increasing memberships, and the perennial issue of finding adequate space 
for physical work consuming his attention.113 
 This seemingly lackadaisical attitude toward the Greco-Turkish conflict stemmed 
from the fact that both during the First World War and again after the Greek occupation, 
İzmir had been governed by two exceptional administrators: Rahmi Bey, the Turkish Vali 
of the city during the Great War, and Aristidis Sterghiades, İzmir’s Greek High 
Commissioner from 1919-1922. Rahmi Bey had single-handedly saved İzmir from 
destruction in March of 1915 when, the city being endangered by bombardment and 
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occupation by a British fleet, he threatened to burn the city rather than see it occupied. 
The British Levantines protested their country’s actions, and thus the city was spared. 
Rahmi Bey likewise managed to ingratiate himself with city’s Levantines, and believing 
the Empire to be on the losing side of the war, often disregarded orders from İstanbul. He 
protected the city’s foreign institutions as best he could, and even conducted something 
of his own foreign policy, making overtures to the Entente for an Ottoman surrender as 
early as 1916.114 
 After the Greek occupation of İzmir, Venizelos appointed Sterghiades, a fellow 
Cretan, as the Greek High Commissioner for Anatolia. Despite his association with the 
Venizelist party, his effectiveness as an administrator, coupled with the Royalist 
government’s continuation of the Venizelist foreign policy in Asia Minor, guaranteed his 
position even after Venizelos’ electoral defeat.115 A scholar of Islamic law and previously 
an administrator of a similar kind in Salonika after the city was ceded to Greece during 
the First Balkan War, Sterghiades, described by Consul Horton, was “possessed of a strict 
sense of justice and a high ideal of duty, he lived as a hermit, accepting no invitations, 
and never appearing in society. He wished, he informed me, to accept no favors and to 
form no ties, so that he might administer equal justice to all, high and low alike.” To 
demonstrate his impartiality, upon assuming control of the city, he publically executed 
three Greeks for disturbing the peace, and openly quarreled with the Greek clergy of the 
city, even going so far as to stop a church service when the sermon by Archbishop 
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Chrysostomos veered into politics.116 Known by the moniker “the Just,” Sterghiades was 
nevertheless an open adherent of the aims of the Megali Idea, believing that by 
maintaining order and building an effective administration in İzmir, the Greeks could 
thus create a new civilization in Asia Minor reflective of the best of their Hellenic 
traditions.117  Because of Sterghiades supervision, İzmir remained relatively free of the 
internecine conflict that irredentist warfare was likely to spark.118 
The Destruction of İzmir 
 Despite the seeming tranquility in İzmir proper, by the summer of 1922, the 
circumstances of the war had largely turned against Greece. Until the watershed Battle of 
Sakarya in August of 1921, the Greek army had been able to maneuver freely in Anatolia, 
and indeed came close at this battle to routing Atatürk’s forces and taking the nationalist 
capital, Ankara. Thereafter, however, the Turks assumed the initiative. France and Italy, 
recognizing the shifting military circumstances, withdrew their forces from Cilicia and 
Antalya, respectively, during the autumn of 1921. The Soviet Union was actively 
supplying the nationalist army with money and weapons, as Ankara had in March of 
1921 concluded its first diplomatic treaty with Moscow, which left Great Britain, more 
specifically Lloyd George, alone supporting Greece in Asia Minor.119 With the will of the 
Greek populace flagging and the ability of the Kingdom to finance the war swiftly 
coming to an end, some forward-looking Hellenes, Sterghiades among them, began to 
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talk of suing for peace or even evacuation.120 In a desperate measure to end the war in 
one stroke, the mentally unstable commander of the Greek army, Georgios Hatzianestis, 
moved troops from Anatolia to Eastern Thrace in an attempt to take Allied-occupied 
İstanbul, which presumably would demoralize the Turkish nationalists into submission 
and end the conflict. When the British and French promised that an attempt on the city 
would be met with military force, the Greeks backed down. Kemal then opened his final 
offensive on August 26, recapturing city after city as he drove the Greek army before him 
to the coast on his way to İzmir.121 
 The rumors of the Turkish offensive and rout of the Greek army at Uşak were 
mostly dismissed at first, but as the steady stream of Greek soldiers and refugees from the 
interior turned into a flood, the European citizens of İzmir with the means to flee the city 
began to do so. With over one hundred and fifty thousand refugees from the interior 
congregating in the city, a number growing at a rate of thirty thousand per day, Jacob and 
Caleb Lawrence of the International College formed a relief committee to stave off what 
was fast evolving into a humanitarian disaster.122 With the fall of the Greek government 
and resignation of High Commissioner Sterghiades on September 7, the situation in İzmir 
continued to descend into anarchy, leaving only Allied consuls such as Horton in 
authority.123 By the time the Turks entered the city on September 9, every American 
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institution in the city was housing refugees, including one hundred in the city’s 
YMCA.124 
 Upon entering İzmir, the now-victorious Mustapha Kemal declared an amnesty, 
and stated that any Turkish soldier caught looting Christian property or harming any 
minorities would be immediately shot.125 The peace lasted not a day. As Consul Horton 
put it, “As the Turkish cavalry was entering İzmir on the morning of the ninth, some fool 
threw a bomb,” and by the evening of the same day, “the looting and killing began.”126 
Despite the presence of Allied ships in İzmir’s harbor, there was no concerted 
intergovernmental assistance to the city’s population in the days that followed. Even 
Greece refused to help its fellow Hellenes stranded in the city, with the Allies assuming 
that the Americans would take responsibility for the relief effort, despite its having no 
official recognition of either Constantine’s or Kemal’s governments.127  
 The refugees from the Anatolian interior and the citizens unable to evacuate on 
the last Greeks ships were trapped, entirely dependent upon the western relief 
organizations for sustenance and the few soldiers left behind to guard American and 
British property for protection. The violence that greeted the Turks’ entry into the city 
had only worsened in the days since İzmir’s recapture, with Jacob noting the rising 
number of dead in the streets and homes, and the Armenian quarter having been almost 
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completely looted since the Turks’ arrival.128 Still, the worst was yet to come for the 
Greeks and Armenians of İzmir. 
 On the 14th, Admiral Bristol sent a cable from İstanbul to Washington stating 
tersely:  
 Wireless just received from my chief of staff at Smyrna states city is burning and  
that all American naturalized citizens and that women of native born Americans 
have been evacuated to Athens on destroyer Simpson in charge of Consul Horton. 
No details are given.129 
 
Around one o’clock in the afternoon on the thirteenth, a fire had broken out in İzmir’s 
Armenian quarter, and within twenty-four hours the conflagration had devastated not 
only that part of the city, but the Greek and European quarters as well.130 The inferno 
drove the few Greeks and Armenians who remained in hiding to join the refugees on the 
quayside, swelling the number there to an estimated three hundred thousand.131 The 
populace was now trapped between the fire raging in the portside European district, and 
the waters of the harbor. On September 19, Kemal issued a proclamation that all refugee 
men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five were immediately considered prisoners 
of war, and that anyone remaining in the city after October 1 would be taken prisoner and 
deported to the interior, as were the Armenians in 1915.132  
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 Asa Jennings had only been with the İzmir YMCA as its new boys’ work 
secretary for a few weeks when the Turks entered the city, but he was instrumental in 
assisting Jacob in organizing the İzmir relief committee and housing refugees in the 
YMCA and his home.133 While British and American ships had begun sporadically taking 
on refugees and transporting them to nearby islands, Jennings recognized that there were 
not enough ships to transport the remaining refugees to safety before Kemal’s October 
deadline for their evacuation. With his family safely away on an American destroyer, 
Jennings resolved to personally muster as many ships as possible to begin transporting 
the mass of refugees on the quayside to safety in the Aegean isles.  
 Having received the American destroyer Edsall’s launch boat from its 
commander, Halsey Powell, Jennings first went to the French steamer Pierre Loti and 
interviewed its captain about taking on some of the refugees. Receiving a refusal, he then 
moved on to the Italian cargo ship, the Constaninapoli, repeating his request, and initially 
received another denial, with the Italian captain stating that he had orders to transport 
only cargo, not refugees, to İstanbul.  However, when Jennings offered him five thousand 
lire to take two thousand refugees to Mytilene, with another thousand after he had 
finished the job, the captain agreed, thus beginning the great evacuation of İzmir’s 
refugees.134  
 With permission from both the Italian consul to use the ship and the Turkish 
authorities to evacuate some of the refugees, the Constaninapoli transported the two 
thousand refugees to Mytilene, where to Jennings’ shock, the twenty Greek transports 
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that had been used to evacuate the occupying Hellenic army after their August route were 
laying dormant in the city’s harbor. Commander Powell had in the meantime received a 
guarantee from the Turks not to attack Greek ships meant to transport refugees from the 
city, provided they did not fly the Greek flag or dock on the wharf, so Jennings 
immediately went to the Greek General Frankos at Mytilene, asking for permission to use 
the transports. At first open to the idea, Frankos then demurred, fearing that the Turks, 
who had no navy to speak of, would seize the ships and continue their offensive against 
the Greeks in the Aegean islands off western Anatolia.  
 However, Frankos did allow Jennings aboard the battleship Kilkis to wire the 
Greek central government with the same request for using the ships. Jennings received an 
even more cautious answer from Athens, which similarly feared a Turkish seizure of the 
ships, despite Ankara’s assurances and the added protection of having American 
destroyers accompany the ships in and out of the harbor. On September 23, with scarcely 
a week remaining before Kemal’s deadline for the refugees, Jennings, weary of Athens’ 
irresolution in the face of an ongoing humanitarian catastrophe, sent the Greek 
government an ultimatum: 
I told them that if I did not receive a favorable reply by six o’clock that evening, I 
would wire openly, without code, so that the message could be picked up by any 
wireless station near, that the Turkish authorities had given permission for Greek 
ships to evacuate refugees from Smyrna, that the American navy had guaranteed 
protection to these ships, that I assumed responsibility for directing them to Greek 
soil in safety, that all we lacked was ships, and that the Greek Government would 
not permit Greek ships to save Greek and Armenian refugees awaiting certain 
death or worse! 135 
Around six o’clock the same evening, Jennings received a reply that said all Greek 
vessels in the Aegean had been placed under his personal command, making him, 
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temporarily, an Admiral of the Greek navy. Over the next week, with the Greek navy at 
his disposal, Jennings engineered the evacuation of the remaining three hundred thousand 
refugees on the quay at İzmir, and was almost solely responsible for staying a near-
certain replication of the 1915 deportation of the Ottoman Armenians, which was deadly 
to almost everyone involved.  
 The Great Fire of İzmir has in Greek historiography represented the closing act of 
the Megali Idea, which not only was a resounding failure as a foreign policy, but also 
indirectly led to the permanent destruction of the almost three thousand year old Greek 
community in Asia Minor, an occurrence that to some Greek scholars stands next to the 
1453 fall of Constantinople in historical importance.136 In many respects, the events at 
İzmir represent a watershed in the history of Christian missions in Asia Minor as well, 
though this fact has been much overlooked by most historians of the topic. The Greeks 
and Armenians of the Ottoman Empire, long the primary targets of western missionaries, 
had by the end of the Greco-Turkish War either been killed or driven out of Turkish 
domains, leaving the missionaries bereft of potential converts. Furthermore, the new 
nationalist government of the Turkish Republic was to take a much less tolerant view of 
western institutions desiring to operate in the country, especially ones advocating the 
Christian faith of the European powers that had dominated its lands for most of the 
previous century. “Is there any chance that the Y.M.C.A. can again take hold in Smyrna? 
Our constituency…are gone. The Y.M.C.A has had three glorious years. Let us hope that 
it faithfully served its purpose before it was wiped out.”137 The hero of the İzmir fire on 
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the other hand, Asa Jennings, was less pessimistic about the organization’s chances in the 
new country, and scarcely before the embers of İzmir had gone out, Jennings mind was lit 
with a new idea to continue the YMCA’s work in Turkey in a manner both continuous 
with the institution’s traditions and indicative of the course it was to take in the newly 
nationalistic Middle East.  
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V. THE ANATOLIA PROJECT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Early Kemalist Era 
Having driven out the Greek army and concluded a peace acceptable to the 
nascent Turkish Republic with the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the victorious Mustafa 
Kemal was to have remarked, “The war is over with ourselves victorious, but our real 
struggle for independence is to begin only now―this is the struggle to achieve Western 
civilization.”138 “Turkey for the Turks” was only the first goal of Kemal and his acolytes, 
who were intent on bringing the Turkish people out of what they perceived as its 
medievalism and into the modern world, meaning the civilization of the West.139 Over the 
next decade, through the vehicle of the Republican People’s Party (RPP), the Kemalists 
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dominated the political life of the Turkish Republic, and initiated a sweeping program of 
societal reform bent on remaking the Turkish nation in the image of Europe, embodied by 
the “Six Arrows” of the RPP: republicanism, nationalism, populism, e’tatism, secularism, 
and revolution.140  
 The list of reforms is extensive, affecting government, civil law, the economy, 
and especially the role of religion in society. Islam had remained the ideological 
cornerstone of the Ottoman state from the beginning, and even the most progressive of 
the nineteenth century Tanzimat reformers had never questioned its place in society or 
sought to jettison religion from the public sphere. Especially after the long reign of 
Abdülhamid II, however, in which the role of Islam as a political weapon intensified, 
many Turkish intellectuals, some of whom would later join the Young Turk Committee 
of Union and Progress that dominated the empire between 1908 and 1918, began to turn 
to positivism and laïcite as another solution to the empire’s ills. As early as 1912, the 
Young Turk intellectual, Abdullah Cevdet, was calling for the ban of the fez and the 
abolition of dervish lodges, closing religious schools or madrasas and replacing them 
with technical schools, and simplifying the Ottoman language.141 
 Though Kemal would not have openly professed animosity to Islam, desiring 
rather to reduce it to a rational, “scientific” religion akin to deism, there is little question 
that a major thrust of the reforms of the 1920s and 1930s was the disestablishment of 
Islam in government and law and the curtailment of its role in society.142 Only a month 
                                                            
 
140 Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, 63. These six principles were in 1937 written into the Turkish 
constitution, making Kemalism the official ideology of the Turkish state.  
 
141 Tuncay Saygin and Mehmet Önal, “’Secularism from the Last Years of the Ottoman Empire to the Early 
Turkish Republic,” Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies Vol. 7, No. 20 (Summer, 2008): 35. 
 
64 
 
 
 
after the expulsion of the Greek army and the victory at İzmir, the Grand National 
Assembly abolished the sultanate and scarcely a year later the caliphate. Mehmed VI and 
all remaining members of the Ottoman dynasty were subsequently exiled. The end of the 
sultanate and caliphate both precluded any hope of a constitutional monarchy in which 
religion could retain a place in the country’s government, and also signaled Turkey’s 
repudiation of its longstanding role as head of the Sunni world.  
 With sultanate and caliphate vanquished, and in what conspicuously resembles 
Cevdet’s recommendations, Kemal continued his program to drive Islam out of the public 
sphere. The Dervish orders were outlawed, and their lodges seized by the government 
and converted into state schools. The fez was abolished, and western headgear made 
compulsory. Women were no longer forced to wear the veil, and later received the right 
to vote. Islamic law, the sharia, was replaced with legal codes based on those of 
Switzerland and Italy. Finally, the Arabic script, itself a significant religious symbol, was 
replaced with a modified Latin script, and the Turkish language purged of Arabic and 
Persian loanwords.  
Most significant for the western missionaries who had been operating in the 
Ottoman Empire for the previous century was the Kemalists’ drastic overhaul of the 
education system. The madrasas were closed, and in their place was erected a uniform 
system of primary education overseen by the Ministry of Public Instruction, with western 
subjects like literature, history, and modern languages replacing the traditional ones of 
the Qur’an, hadith, and Arabic and Persian.143 This measure was not reserved for Muslim 
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schools though, and as the millets had been abolished anyway, Christian schools were 
likewise shut down or incorporated into the state system of public schooling. As 
education had been the missionaries most popular and successful work in Turkey, the 
ruling essentially obviated the possibility of their continued presence among the Turks.  
There also was the question of a constituency, as Jacob had hinted at in the 
closing days of the İzmir evacuation. The ethnic cleansing of the city was reenacted on a 
national scale shortly after the inferno with the “Convention Concerning the Exchange of 
Greek and Turkish Populations” signed by Ismet Inönü on January 30, 1923, even before 
the official conclusion of the peace with the Treaty of Lausanne. Excepting the Greek 
Orthodox denizens of İstanbul and the Muslims of western Thrace, every Christian of 
Turkey and Muslim of Greece was forcibly expatriated to their “national” homelands and 
prohibited by law from returning.144 Not only then had the YMCA lost its constituency at 
İzmir, but the entire western missionary enterprise in Turkey was also thus deprived of 
clientele. With the new legal restrictions on their schools, and a dearth of students to 
populate them, American missions in Turkey were largely left in limbo during the early 
years of the republic.  
Jennings’ Desire to Continue 
The situation for the YMCA in Turkey reflected this general uncertainty, at least 
in the waning months of 1922 and early ones of 1923, when the details of the Treaty of 
Lausanne were being forged, and the great movement of populations between Greece and 
Turkey was being conducted. Jacob, having fled to Athens after the fire, despaired of the 
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situation in the country, and requested a transfer elsewhere.145 Jennings on the other hand 
remained, having received a personal request from Admiral Bristol to stay in the region. 
And under the auspices of Near East Relief, an American missionary organization 
founded in 1915 to aid the Armenians and Assyrian Christians displaced by the war, 
Jennings continued to assist in the evacuation of Greek refugees from Anatolia. The 
İstanbul YMCA was for the time being secure though, with the city’s governor, Adnan 
Bey, foregoing any question of its status until after the peace was finalized at 
Lausanne.146 
While Jennings was confident that the YMCA could continue its work in Anatolia 
despite the events of the previous several months, his plans for future activities in İzmir 
did not take shape until well into 1923, with work among refugees and the population 
exchange monopolizing his time.147 However, refusing to admit that the YMCA had ever 
“quit” İzmir, Jennings went back to the city in April to survey the prospects of a return, 
and received a great deal of encouragement from the American and Turkish businessmen 
of İzmir, as well as the city’s vali and mayor. Of particular interest to Jennings was the 
“Turkish Young Men’s Union,” which had recently opened, based much on the model of 
the YMCA and the city’s previous “American Turkish club,” founded by John Kingsley 
Birge.148 İzmir’s mayor, Şükrü Kaya, at first only tentatively supportive, eventually 
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agreed to accept Jennings’ cooperation, leaving him to detail the minutiae of the 
agreement and gain the approval of both the International Committee of the YMCA and 
the Turkish government.149 
Having received oral commitments of support from the new American Consul at 
İzmir, Albert Treat, the President of the International College, Cass Arthur Reed, and the 
overseer of the American Board in Turkey, Dr. W.W. Peet, Jennings submitted a 
preliminary proposal to the YMCA’s International Committee in July of 1923, outlining 
the challenging political situation in the nascent Turkish Republic, while also reaffirming 
his belief in the possibility of renewed YMCA work there. Acknowledging that the policy 
of “Turkey for the Turks” and the longstanding animosity of Muslims toward western 
Christianity ostensibly impeded the future of evangelistic work, Jennings indicated that 
the more “liberal minded Turks” were seeking to develop the same kind of character-
building institutions that the YMCA had long promulgated, and that they welcomed the 
association’s assistance, provided that political and religious topics remained off limits. 
Furthermore, as the expelled Ottoman Greeks and Armenians had largely constituted the 
empire’s commercial and financial base, and relatively few Turks were capable of filling 
these crucial positions, the “national policy” required competent substitutes as quickly as 
possible, and the YMCA was well-positioned to offer the kind of trade education 
necessary to build an indigenous, “national” Turkish business class. Jennings then 
proposed a “Community Social Service Center” in İzmir, but did not specify the types of 
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activities in which this establishment would engage, perhaps assuming that traditional 
YMCA work would continue, excepting anything with the taint of Christianity.150 
With the approval of the American Board, and the International College offering 
Jennings the use of its buildings in İzmir, which had gone unused since the fire, the 
International Committee agreed to back Jennings’ plan at İzmir, offering to help accrue 
the necessary funds for the project, and agreeing to provide secretaries to assist Jennings. 
Not negotiable, however, was the name; whatever the final title of the organization was to 
be, the YMCA would have to be acknowledged in it if the International Committee was 
to act as a sponsor.151    
Convincing the Turkish government to adopt Jennings’ “Anatolian Project” was 
to prove more problematic, precisely because of the nationalistic and secular policies of 
the young republic. Over the summer of 1924, Jennings engaged in a protracted series of 
negotiations with the Turkish Minister of Public Instruction, Vassif Bey, concerning how 
Jennings’ ideas could take shape in a manner acceptable to the Kemalist ideology. 
Jennings’ initial trip to Ankara was largely a success, with Vassif Bey agreeing to the 
creation of a central committee of an equal number of Americans and Turks to direct the 
organization. It would solely be a nationalist, indigenous movement, and educational and 
physical work would remain the priorities of the new association.152 Jennings’ second trip 
to Ankara further clarified the organizational details, with the central committee being 
composed of six Americans appointed by Jennings, and six Turks appointed by Vassif 
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Bey, who was to chair the organization. Ankara, not İzmir, was to be the organization’s 
first locale, with six other sites to follow. The Americans, while being provided with 
suitable buildings in each city where an association opened, were nonetheless financially 
responsible for erecting the facility at Ankara, and were likewise tasked with covering the 
startup costs of every subsequent municipal organization.153  
The only points of great contention during the negotiations between Jennings and 
the Minister of Public Instruction were those connected to the name of the YMCA, and 
the specific nature of the educational activities at the proposed Turkish-American clubs. 
Mott and the International Committee had been insistent that the YMCA be 
acknowledged in the name of the new organization, proposing “The Preparation for Life 
Club of the Y.M.C.A.” as a possible title.154 The Vassif Bey, however, was equally as 
adamant that not only could the YMCA’s name not be in the title of the new 
organization, but there was to be no open connection between the Turkish government 
and the YMCA, which had the double charge against it of being both a religious 
organization in a secular state, and a Christian organization in a predominantly Muslim 
society. Furthermore, even the “moral education” written into Jennings’ proposals was 
found to be offensive, and Vassif Bey insisted on replacing it with “social education” so 
as to not offend the sensibilities of the Kemalists who dominated the government.155  
From the standpoint of the International Committee, the Turkish resolve on these points, 
while “not entirely reassuring,” was nonetheless superseded by the “supreme value” of 
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establishing a working relationship with the Turks after almost a century of previous 
failures.156  
 The differences between Vassif and the YMCA were quickly swept aside when 
Jennings received an enormous pledge of financial support from Arthur Nash, an 
industrialist who claimed to have procured his fortune by following the “golden rule,” 
and deemed that Jennings’ proposed work among the Turks was precisely in this spirit.157 
While the International Committee was assisting the Turkish-American organization in 
procuring funds by giving Jennings its donor lists for foreign service, Jennings had 
managed by early 1925 to raise enough money to work for one year.158 Nash, through a 
trust under the supervision of the Universalist Convention, was offering twenty-five 
thousand dollars to initialize the project in 1925, with fifty thousand dollars per year from 
1926-1930 to follow.159 His only request was that John Ascham, like Jennings an 
ordained Methodist minister who held a longstanding interest in Near Eastern affairs, be 
assigned to the project as a YMCA secretary and Jennings’ primary assistant.160  
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Anatolian Project and the Turkish Hearth 
 With the generous donation having been made public, Jennings conferred with the 
new Minister of Public Instruction, Hamdullah Suphi Bey, an acquaintance from both 
Jennings’ relief work and the initial stages of the Anatolian project. At first pledging to 
reaffirm the agreement between the YMCA and the Turkish government that his 
predecessor, Vassif Bey, had negotiated, Hamdullah Suphi then, without warning or any 
possibility of appeal, completely rearranged the details of the Turkish-American clubs’ 
administration.161 The Kurdish rebellion under Sheikh Sa’id earlier in the year had served 
to intensify nationalistic feelings among the Turks, leading the government to tighten its 
grip on foreign institutions operating in the country.162 Furthermore, Hamdullah Suphi 
claimed that several European governments had proposed projects similar to Jennings’ 
Turkish-American clubs. Undoubtedly due to the powerful Armenian lobby under the 
leadership of the outspoken nationalist Vahan Cardashian, the American Senate had 
perennially refused to ratify the “American” Treaty of Lausanne. Thus, the original 
proposal between Jennings and the Turkish government was to be altered.163 Jennings’ 
Anatolian Project was effectively nationalized, with Nash’s funds to be deposited in a 
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Turkish bank, Jennings and Ascham made employees of the Turkish government, and 
their work to be conducted under the auspices of the Turkish Hearth, or Türk Ocağı.164  
 The Turkish Hearth mirrored the YMCA movement in that its goals were, at least 
at first, non-political and non-sectarian, seeking only to buttress and elevate the Turkish 
people through education and the awakening of a sense of “Turkishness.” The Hearth 
movement was established in the nationalistic milieu following the Young Turk 
revolution of 1908. Prominent Turkist and pan-Turanist intellectuals such as Yusuf 
Akçura, Halide Edib, and Ziya Gökalp, were all involved in the movement’s founding.165 
Like the Young Turk movement, the Turkish Hearth began in the military medical school 
in İstanbul, and whereas the Committee of Union and Progress was a decidedly political 
organization, the Hearths were dedicated to a cultural nationalism, forming clubs 
throughout the Ottoman Empire that offered theatrical and musical performances, 
lectures, and art exhibitions glorifying the Turkish people, as well as publishing a popular 
journal, “Turkish Homeland” (Türk Yurdu), all “to advance the national education and 
raise the scientific, social and economic level of the Turks who are the foremost of the 
peoples of Islam.”166 Because of its association with the anathematized Committee of 
Union and Progress, as well as its pan-Turkism and pan-Turanism, both highly suspect 
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ideas under the Kemalist regime that disavowed foreign adventurism, the Turkish Hearth 
saw its influence significantly wane during the early years of the republic.167  
 It is not insignificant then that Hamdullah Suphi Bey, in addition to being the new 
Minister of Public Instruction, had also been the head of the Turkish Hearth movement 
since its inception in 1912, and remained during his tenure in the government. Indeed, 
Jennings’ original negotiations with Vassif Bey had taken place at the Hearth center in 
Ankara and had been attended by Hamdullah Suphi Bey. Furthermore, Hamdullah Suphi 
looked upon YMCAS as models for the Hearths of the early republic.168 Given that the 
United States’ failure to ratify the “American” Treaty of Lausanne was already several 
years old, and that the European governments who purportedly offered the Turks 
assistance with social work remained unnamed, it seems clear that Hamdullah Suphi used 
his position as Minister of Education to divert Nash’s funds to the group over which he 
had presided for the past decade by simply nationalizing Jennings’ organization. Jennings 
refused to accept the appearance of bad faith on the part of the Turks though, and at least 
for the time being, he and Ascham were scheduled to be employees of the Turkish 
government and advisors to the Turkish Hearth organization.169 
 Hamdullah Suphi Bey’s desire to replenish the coffers of the Turkish Hearth was 
a far less grievous offense than what Jennings was to face from his American colleague, 
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Dr. Ascham, and financial backer, Arthur Nash. Having tired of what he saw as 
insufficient progress toward concluding a final agreement with the Turks and beginning 
concrete work in Anatolia, Nash directed Ascham to privately ask Jennings to feign 
illness and step down, which would leave Ascham in charge of the project and in a place 
to mediate directly between Nash and the Turkish government.170 Given that the project 
was entirely his creation, Jennings naturally refused. At the first meeting of the Anatolian 
Project’s central committee, Ascham produced a letter from Nash directing him to 
negotiate the transfer to the Hearth of almost half of the proposed two hundred and fifty 
thousand dollars over the next six months, which in the eyes of the central committee 
effectively precluded the need for its existence. On account of his money, Nash, with 
Ascham as his representative, was attempting to usurp control of Jennings’ project, using 
the good will and fame he had engendered among the Turks to lend a humanitarian 
veneer to what amounted to a simple donation to a Turkist youth group.171 Finally, after a 
months-long, acrimonious, and deeply-personal imbroglio between Jennings and 
Ascham, the YMCA ended Ascham’s “employment,” and completely withdrew from its 
involvement with Nash and the Turkish Hearth.172   
The Smyrna Welfare Council 
 Very much in character, Jennings tenaciously pressed on with his idea for social 
service in İzmir. On a return trip to Ankara to amend the contract for the home he was to 
rent while working for the Turkish Hearth, Jennings had a chance encounter on the train 
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with Hamdullah Suphi, who despite his erstwhile perfidy concerning Nash’s funding of 
his organization, prodded Jennings to pursue his idea of a social service center in İzmir, 
and invited him to stay in Ankara for the celebration of the founding of the republic.173 
He then returned to İzmir on yet another exploratory mission, and was granted an 
audience with the city’s mayor, Hüseyin Aziz Akyürek, and İzmir province’s governor, 
Kiazim Paşa, who asked Jennings to clarify his relation to the YMCA in İstanbul, and 
explain his plan for service in İzmir. Contradicting Hamdullah Suphi’s claims concerning 
the government’s insistence that Jennings’ project be carried out under the auspices of the 
Hearth, Kiazim explained that, as governor, he retained enough independence from 
Ankara to allow Jennings to carry on in İzmir, and proposed to do so, assuming the same 
provisions of non-sectarianism and devotion to Turkish nationalism were in place.174 
With the Foreign Committee’s resolution approving the continuation of his project, and 
enough funds even without Nash’ donation to begin work immediately, Jennings again 
set himself to the work of creating a program of social service to the Turkish people.175 
In contrast with the long delay that had accompanied Jennings and Ascham’s 
collusion with the Hearth, the work on Jennings’ latest “Anatolia Project” began almost 
immediately, and signified the kind of service Jennings’ had in mind from the 
beginning.176 Organizationally, the work was very much under the control of the Turkish 
government, which would prevent any transgression of national principles. The central 
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committee of the organization was composed of twenty members of the Turkish 
assembly, with a “community welfare council” of nine Turks and three Americans to 
oversee the daily operations of the project. 
 The organization’s work was threefold: Translations and Publications, primarily 
entailing of materials directed at youth education and health; Social Service, which 
included a range of activities from establishing an orphanage and clinics to running 
summer camps and a “boys’ club”; and finally, Playground and Public Recreation, which 
amounted to a municipal park organization.177 The Smyrna Welfare Council notably went 
on to establish an orphanage, to erect Turkey’s first playground and a field for athletics, 
and to offer both Turkish and foreign language instruction in one of İzmir’s mosques.178 
 The success of the Smyrna Welfare Council attracted enough attention in the 
capital for the Turkish government to relocate Jennings and his staff to the Ankara, where 
it was thought his work would have a more widespread influence, leaving the İzmir 
organization to be administered solely by Turks. Indeed, Jennings had so much continued 
success that in 1930, with the assistance of the Turkish Ambassador to the United States, 
Ahmed Muhtar, and American notables such as the educational reformer John Dewey, 
Jennings’ longtime friend Admiral Mark Bristol, industrialist Cleveland Dodge, and 
William Hoover, the founder of the Hoover Vacuum Cleaner company, he was able to 
incorporate the American Friends of Turkey. Essentially one of the first organized 
foreign lobbying groups in the United States, the American Friends of Turkey, through 
fellowships and scholarships to Turkish students, was designed to offer the Turkish 
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Republic firsthand knowledge of American “institutions and organizations,” and instruct 
the Turkish nation in modern methods of agriculture, animal husbandry, and business 
administration, as well as nursing, engineering, and dentistry.179 And even with Jennings’ 
death in 1933, the American Friends of Turkey remains one of his lasting legacies, being 
one of the organizations that eventually became the American Turkish Council, one of 
the most powerful Turkish lobbying institutions in the United States today.180 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Few scholars would dispute the proposition that the nineteenth century gave birth 
to the nationalistic idea that eventually ruined the monarchical and imperialistic regimes 
that had governed Europe and dominated much of the non-western world for centuries. 
The principle of ethnic self-determination enshrined in the various treaties that concluded 
the First World War was at least a reflection of the spirit of nationalism. Similarly, the 
nineteenth century is almost universally understood by scholars as the zenith of the 
American Protestant missionary movement, which, seeking to follow John Mott’s dictum 
to “evangelize the world in this generation,” inevitably encountered the groups beginning 
to conceive of themselves as nations.  And while there has been an abundance of 
scholarly work done on nationalism on the one hand and missions on the other, the full 
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repercussions of the interaction between the growth of nationalism and the spread of 
American Protestantism have yet to be fully defined, especially in the Islamic world. To 
be sure, the educational efforts of western missionaries, especially in the area of 
language, have been credited with kindling a sense of cultural pride that contributed to 
nationalistic feelings among the Arabs and Armenians in particular. One noted scholar of 
nationalism, Elie Kedourie, at least postulated that the introduction into the Islamic world 
of the Protestant idea of sola fides may have been partially responsible for the rapidity 
with which nationalism gained ground in the Ottoman Empire, but his idea was not 
pursued in any depth.181 Significantly, the few scholars who have proposed a connection 
between the two movements typically discuss the effect of the missionary upon the 
budding nationalist, and almost never the reverse. 
The Great Idea, with its aim of a reconstituted Byzantine Empire, remained the 
core of Hellenic nationalism during the first century of its existence. Though the Ottoman 
Empire’s political and military decline was painfully obvious by the nineteenth century, 
the Kingdom of Greece was at no point before the First World War strong enough to 
retake eastern Thrace, western Anatolia, or the ultimate prize of İstanbul. Furthermore, 
though many philhellenic Europeans shared the Greek Kingdom’s atavistic fantasy of the 
restoration of Byzantium, the chess-like game of nineteenth century European diplomacy, 
in which the preservation of the Ottoman Empire was necessary as a bulwark against 
Russian expansion into the eastern Mediterranean, precluded the likelihood of a 
substantive fulfillment of the Great Idea. The Greek occupation of Asia Minor after the 
war was only made possible by a confluence of unique factors: the total capitulation of 
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the Ottoman Empire, the fall of Russia to communism, the British need for an effective 
proxy in the Mediterranean, and, perhaps most importantly, the rise of the charismatic 
Greek statesman, Eleftherios Venizelos.  
Unlike the Greek Great Idea, whose objectives had been formulated shortly after 
independence and remained relatively constant until the 1920s, the development of 
Turkish nationalism was a lengthier and more uncertain process. Indeed, nationalism 
itself was the bane of the empire in the century preceding World War One. As Yusuf 
Akçura outlined in “Three Types of Policy,” Ottomanism, or the creation of a devotion to 
the Ottoman state that would transcend nationality, could not hold back the nationalist 
tide emanating from Europe, despite its widespread popularity among Ottoman 
intellectuals during the nineteenth century. The pan-Islam of Abdülhamid II, though 
effective as a propaganda tool to consolidate the Sultan’s power, was similarly unable to 
stem nationalistic sentiment among the Ottoman subjects. For example, Muslim Arabs, 
though co-religionists with the rulers of the Ottoman state, by the time of the First World 
War were advocating the establishment of either a single pan-Arab state encompassing all 
Arabic-speakers, or smaller regional states. Whether it was the ambitious pan-Turkism of 
Enver Paşa or the truncated “Anatolianism” of the Kemalists, a uniquely “Turkish” 
nationalism was the only option remaining for Ottoman leaders. The Turkist “policy,” 
however, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, proved much more effective than either 
Ottomanism or pan-Islam, demonstrated by the fact that even today Kemalist nationalism 
remains the ruling ideology of the Turkish state.  
The challenge for the YMCA at İzmir was how to effectively navigate between 
the Greek Great Idea on the one hand, and the Turkish nationalism of the Kemalists on 
81 
 
 
 
the other. Although the YMCA was in its origins a decidedly Christian, missionary 
institution, by the fin de siècle the overtly religious aspect of its work had greatly 
declined. Like the other great missionary organizations of the nineteenth century, such as 
the American Board, the YMCA moved away from proselytism toward social service, 
primarily medical and educational work. Though American missionaries historically had 
had little success among the Orthodox of both the Greek Kingdom and the Ottoman 
Empire, the YMCA’s mission to İzmir during the Greek occupation demonstrated the 
efficacy of a non-evangelistic model for Christian missions. The Great Idea of 
resuscitating Hellenism in Asia Minor was well-served by an American Christian 
organization dedicated not to accruing converts to Protestantism, but to providing the 
citizens of İzmir with a basic education, moral instruction, and a mean for bettering their 
physical health.  
The destruction of İzmir, which brought an end to the nationalist conflagrations 
that had plagued the Ottoman Empire’s final century, also signified a turning point in 
both Christian missions in Turkey, and perhaps in the wider Islamic world as well. 
During the imperial era, religion, either Islam or one of the branches of Eastern 
Christianity, had presented foremost an intellectual obstacle to successful missionary 
work. In the era after the First World War, however, nationalism became the primary 
ideology with which the missionary had to contend. The young Turkish Republic was an 
especially challenging environment for American missionary organizations like the 
YMCA. The Ottoman Greeks and Armenians, the longstanding targets of missionary 
work, had been either killed during the war, or driven out after it. Furthermore, Kemalist 
nationalism was a decidedly secular ideology, devoted to divesting the state of religion 
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and driving it into the private sphere. As education had remained a staple of American 
missionary throughout the nineteenth century, particularly for the YMCA, the Kemalist 
challenge to religious education made continued work in Turkey a daunting prospect.  
The YMCA’s response to this challenge was to further “secularize” its mission. 
Because Asa Jennings, the hero of the İzmir disaster, remained a trusted figure among 
both Turkish and American leaders, as well as the International Committee of the 
YMCA, he was able to convince all parties of the worth of a continued mission at İzmir. 
The content of Jennings’ work in Turkey though, mostly educational and social work, did 
not substantively differ from what the YMCA had done there previously. What did 
change, however, was that in the new nationalist, secular environment of the republic, the 
“mission” was no longer even nominally Christian. With even Islam driven out of the 
public sphere, Christianity surely had to follow. 
Rather than demonstrating the influence of missionaries upon nationalism, then, 
the experience of the YMCA at İzmir shows the reverse: the effect of the nationalist ideal 
upon Christian missions. The İzmir association, born under the Greek irredentist 
occupation of western Asia Minor, was likewise a participant in the catastrophic 
destruction of the city, itself a result of nationalist warfare between Greeks and Turks. 
Because of the fiercely nationalistic and laicist nature of the Kemalist government of 
Turkey during the early years of the republic, the YMCA, or rather Asa Jennings’ 
Anatolian Project, was forced to “secularize” the mission, stripping itself of anything that 
even hinted of religion or Christianity and devoting itself entirely to the betterment of the 
Turkish nation, even being effectively nationalized when the organization was subsumed 
under the Turkish Hearth movement. By the time of Jennings’ eventual success with the 
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community welfare council and American Friends of Turkey, the idea of proselytism, 
even in the benign form of setting a Christ-like example, was decidedly not part of 
Jennings’ work. The YMCA at İzmir, along with Asa Jennings’ efforts to continue on in 
Anatolia, represents a turning point in Christian missions: the nationalism that 
missionaries had helped to foster during the nineteenth century began to alter the mission, 
forcing western missionaries into the open service of the national idea rather than that of 
spreading the Gospel.  
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